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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Or FARM RELIEF
At the present time the problem of Farm Relief is most dras-
tic. Before considering the recent developments it is necessary to
picture the historical "background of the situation,
"The independent farmer of today is the descendant of the
pioneer of yesterday. The early history both of colonies and nation
was written by the pioneer farmer. It was men and women of this breed
that enabled seaboard agriculture so rapidly to escape the narrow val-
leys and rocky soils on which it first got its foothold. It was they
who subdued the wider, richer lands of western Hew York, Ohio, the
Middle .Vest, and finally, the Far '/est. The brunt of exploring and
developing the continent fell on them, and in the remoter corners of
1
the country the task of pioneering is hardly yet completed."
The pioneer farmer was selected, bred and trained for qual-
ities of individualism and stubborn insistence upon living his own life
in his own way. His very willingness to sacrifice himself and his
women and his children in order to take a chance on the economic future
of any area where they could get a farm of their own has given us not
only the achievements but also some of the disasters of our agricultur-
al history. For the pioneer has "the defects of his qualities", and
often knows not that what was sound and laudable in early daj/s may be-
come economically vicious at a more advanced stage of national develop-
ment. The pioneering of submarginal lands still going on today aggra-
vates the surplus problem, which is generally conceded to be the core o "
present agrarian distress. The survival of pioneer habits of thought
and types of action more or less generally throughout our agricultural
1. ,:Hew Republic" — April 30, 1930
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class has stood in the way of its acceptance of the social discipline
of modern economic life and prevented adequate participation in the
group activities demanded "by present-day economic institutions.
Probably the "hill-billy" farmer represents the most exag-
gerated case of social independence linked with an extreme degree of
geographic isolation. Physically 100-per cent American, with a line o
ancestry running straight back; to colonial days, he is spiritually a
200-per cent American, with the virtue of indomitable independence run(j-
ning to the vicious extreme of touchiness and producing a whimsical
irascibility which has precluded permanent and dependable social organi-
zation.
?he hill-billy farmer as we knew him in the Ozarks represenr
ted the third skimming of the super-independent, who had found even
the light rein of social control in the Appalachians too galling. No
wonder that these farmers dynamited the dipping vats when the govern-
ment tried to carry out a campaign of tick eradication. Ho wonder tha^
the county agricultural agent and the extension specialist from the
college have found them impervious to scientific knowledge and better
farm practices. ITo wonder that the hill-billy farmer has resisted co-
operative organization, that he has breached his contract and bootleg-
ged his produce to any buyer who offered an extra nickel.^"
But the pioneer who went est and enabled the country to grc
up with him, and the hill-hilly who went back into the highlands and
"up to the fork of the creek" where neither law nor convention would
demand anything of him, do not compass the v/hole of rural "independence
1. "New Republic" — April 30, 1930
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There was also the timid soul who felt no urge to crack his whip from
the seat of the covered wagon. Those who remained in the older farm-
ing sections, even though this may have involved parental domination o^
the constraining influence of kinfolk and gossiping neighbors, preser-
ved themselves at least against the need to change old ways to fit a
new environment or altered circumstances. They have been conservative
as to new methods of farming, they have been resistant toward unaccus-
tomed schemes of collective bargaining, calls for information as to
their "intentions to plant," or academic suggestions for the readjust-
ment of their industry.
Of course we do not mean to say that all farmers fall into
one or the other of the too-independent types which we have been dis-
cussing. There are many fine, aggressive, socialized, co-operative
farm proprietors who keep themselves effectively in touch with the edu-
cational forces which constitute the experimental department of their
industry and with their fellow farmers who have like interests in eithe
the technical or business branches of their calling. These men, like-
wise, either individually or in groups, work with little friction and
much understanding at the points of contact where their industry touched
the fields of finance, transportation and marketing.
But however high we may set them qualitatively, they are cfuajj.
titatively but a minor factor in the whole picture of -imerican agricul-
ture. There have not been nearly enough of them, as individual farm prf
prietors, to establish the general level of farm management on such a
blane as to effect a prosperous adjustment of the industry to the con-
•
ditions "by which it has "been confronted over a period of years. There
have not been nearly enough of them to make up the membership of co-op
erative marketing organizations capable of putting the distribution cf
any considerable fraction of our farm products on a really sound and
economical basis. In only a few spots either particularly favored by
the character of the product and natural limitations upon its volume o
production or blessed with an unusually well informed and well finance*
personnel, have commodity groups been formed that are at all comparabL
in their effectiveness with those found everywhere in the ordinary run
1
of non-agricultural business enterprises.
Twenty-two years ago on February 9, 1909, President Roose-
velt submitted to Congress the report of The Country Life Commission.
It was this Commission which first aroused the nation to an awareness
of its "rural problem". President .oosevelt said, "I warm my country
men that the great recent progress made in city life is net a full
measure of our civilization; for our civilization rests at bottom on tlfle
wholes omeness , the attractiveness and completeness, as well as the pros
perity of life in the country— But the disparity between city and
country has continued to increase. The report cf Roosevelt's Country
Life Commission was .generously commended in all quarters, but the agri-
cultural problem is more acute in 1930 than it was twenty years ago.
The agricultural boom of 1910—1920 brought such a high peak
of prosperity to the farmers that the 1930 fall in prices seems very
severe in contrast. High prices of farm products, "war prosperity"
1910—1920, caused land values to rise too fast and too far. These
1. "New Republic" — April 1930

high prices also caused a tremendous over-expansion in farming—the
"bringing in of new lands to the farmers. The worst over-expansion
camo in tho cne-crop areas, such as wheat and cotton. ith this cver-|
expansion in land values and land utilization came a "big increase in
the mortgage debt of the farmers. - igh priced land meant unusual actaJtv
ity in the real estate market, many farmers buying land not to farm bi; t
to sell again. Unfortunately, country banks and farm mortgage compan-|
ies did not put a check on this movement when they were called in to
help finance it. A very tragic situation developed, therefore, in the
case of farmers who bought land at inflated prices and gave a mortgage
on it.
Following the orld ar, came a period of world -.vide depres
sionfrom Japan to the United States and from Canada to South America
The fall in the farmers* income was great and sudden. While the farm-
ers* income was falling his expenses were staying up. As v/as to be
expected with this enormous increase of mortgage indebtedness, for lan
bought at inflated values, came a corresponding increase in the number
of farm bankruptcies, Taxes on farms increased 140> from 1914 to 1923
So also did interest increase in proportion, "he most conservative
loans, those made by the federal Land Banks and the Joint Stock Land
Banks are no exception to this rule.
The Department of -agriculture reported that the hired man o^l
the farm was receiving
;
?28.04 per month without board in 1910, and
j65.05 in 1920.
-hen he was "deflated" along with industrial labor.
His pay fell back ,45.58 in 1921. In taxes, interest and l&bor, there|
!• "Dept. of .igriculture Year Book, U. S. D. A." 1925
r
0fore, the farmer: found his fixed charges still high and out of proporjj.
tion to his income.
As the farmer is a large user of transportation he is vital,
ly interested in freight rates. At various times during the war freight
rates were advanced, and when freight rates are once established und the
railroad company adjusts its scale of wages and program of betterment
to this rate, it is always very difficult and usually unwise to change
this rate. The farmer may therefore, look on a freight rate as a rela4
tively fixed charge. Thus we have a farmer shipping hay in 1919 paying
10.4 pounds out of each 100 pounds of hay for freight; in 1921, he paic
20.2 pounds. So with all other commodities except citrus fruits and
wool the margin is too great — something is decidedly wrong.
Unemployment is generally thought of as an industrial com-
plaint, a symptom of mal-adjustment in the relationship between Capita]]
and >age; Labor and Farmers are supposed to be largely immune. It is
often said that the farmer has one great advantage over the wage earnerlL
in that he cannot be uischarged. -s a matter of fact, this is an illu-
sion. Farmers can be discharged and very frequently are; and they have
been discharged in exceptional numbers in recent years. Thousands are
now underbidding city dwellers in a competitive struggle for an inade-
quate number of jobs. Comparisons between rural and urban standards
of living are difficult to make, because country and city values are
not the same, it takes less cash to run a home in the country, and the
fact that average cash incomes on the farm are less than average cash
incomes in the city does not prove that the farmers are worse off than
(
the wage earners, .-fter all, there are intangible values in farm lif«
which cannot "be measured in cash, riut security is not so substantial
an item in these intangible values ^s most people imagine. our farm
population in January 1929 was estimated at only 27,511,100 compared
with 28,980,000 in January 1925 and 32,076,960 in January 1910. This
decline in a period of rapidly growing urban population, meant that
1
farmers were being discharged.
As to the cause, it is largely identical with the cause of
urban unemployment, x'echnical progress does farmers as well as wage
2
earners out of their jobs. In the four years from 1925 to 1928, in-
clusive, agricultural output in the united States was, according to
the Department of agriculture, about 16fo greater than in the period
from 1919 to 1922, though the acreage in farms was somewhat smaller
2
and the farm personnel much smaller. Fewer farmers, using less land J
produced an enlarged output but substituting engine power for work
animals and by raising better field crops and live-stock. This techni.
cal progress benefited the consumer rather than the producer, because
the market did not expand sufficiently to absorb the resulting increasjbd
production. It was left to the ruthless force of competition to deter
mine which farmers should be allowed to carry on and which should be
required to find other work or starve. "When a farmer has to be dis-
charged he gets more notice than the wage earner usually does, but thajfc
is about the only important difference. Some farmers, it is true, re-
fuse to be discharged, no matter how poorly the game goes against them,
but these people are a class apart, not truly within our system of com
-
1. 'New Republic" — May 28, 1930
2. "Year Book, U. S. D. A." — 1925

mercial farming. Many such are to be found on poor lands in the moun-
tain districts of the South, and in the "marginal land areas" of New
England, ./here the commercial farmers would he forced out , these mar-
ginal men tighten their belts and retire into such a sort of domestic
farm economy, in which they produce something for their own tables hut
very little for the market. They are really not a part of our farming
system, because the land they till is generally not capable of being
farmed economically , and the commercial surplus they produce is practi
cally negligible. It is significant, nevertheless, that nearly AS0> of
the country's farm population according to the Department of Agricul-
ture, live on small farms of poor and difficult land, on a very low
standard of living. In considering the rural aspects of unemployment,
the strictly marginal farmers must be largely ignored. It is not they
but the members of a group higher in the scale, who quit when farming
becomes abnormally unprofitable. This group is eased out, not by the
stern command of an immediate boss, but by the slower process of dis-
couragement or pressure of debt. Sometimes owners become tenants, while
tenants drop to the status of hired men. Young folic leave the farm as
often by compulsion as by choice.
With the same land and the same labor producing increased
crop values like these, the farmers began to scramble for more land,
leading to one of the greatest speculative land booms in the history oi[
America. High prices of farm products, "war prosperity," 1910—1920
caused land values to rise too far and too fast. These high prices
also caused a tremendous over-expansion in farming — the bringing in
of new lands into farms. In these ten prosperous years, 40,000,000

acres of pasture land was plowed up and out in crops j 5,000,000 acros
of forest was cleared for crops. This new land was not needed for
crops and should have "been left in forest or grazing lands.
The worst over-expansion came in the one crop areas, such
as wheat and cotton. Under the stimulus of high prices cotton acreage
increased 17,000,000 acres in five years, and wheat acreage increased
30,000,000 acres in two years.
PUBLIC R5C0GNITI0IT OF THE PROBLEM
In spite of the general indifference of the public and
the banks concerning the farmers' problem, gradually Congress has be-
come conscious of the needs and disadvantages of the farmer. A form
of farm relief proposed by David Lubin in 1896 consisted of a bounty
on agricultural exports. The plan had the support at that time of the
State granges of California, Oregon, Washington, Missouri, Illinois,
Virginia, and Pennsylvania. This plan is now revived under the name
of the export debenture plan. Its aim and effect would be the same as
the McUary-Haugen Plan, namely, raise the price of the farm surplus,
and by thus raising the price stimulate the production of a greater
surplus
.
Following the financial panic of 1920, there were intro-
duced in the Congress of the United States various bills for the re-
lief of agriculture. But during the first six years of this agricul-
tural depression, only one bill, out of many, succeeded in passing
both Houses of Congress. This was the KcKary-Haugen. It passed Con-
gress iTebruary 17, 1927, and was vetoed by President Calvin Coolidge,
1. "Few Republic" — Hay 7, 1930

February 25th, The McKary-Hau£;en Bill represents, therefore, the main
plan of Farm Helief before the country during a period of six years.
Agriculture is the only great industry for which research
is conducted at public expense, -he research laboratories in soil and
chemistry are among the most notable laboratories of the world.
Farmers asked the government for more and cheaper credit.
Their request was liberally granted. After the close of the war the
charter of the ./ar Finance Corporation was renewed three times to aid
agriculture, and in a period of three years a sum of more than o500,000
000. was placed at the service of the farmers.
1
In the year 1914 the Federal Reserve Banking System was
created as a part of our commercial banking system to aid the entire
country, including agriculture. Friends of the farmer criticized the
system for not having at least one farmer on the Federal Reserve Board.
The Law was accordingly amended providing for a "dirt farmer" on the
Board. Commercial borrowers from a Federal Heserve Bank limited to
loans running 90 days or less, agricultural borrowers may borrow up to
nine months. All the farmers' legitimate, short time credit needs are
taken care of by this system. The Heserve Board has ruled that the pro
portion which agricultural paper may form of the entire assets of a Cap
ital Reserve Bank is 99;o« In other words, the Federal Fieserve Banking
System grants special privileges to agriculture denied to all other
classes of borrowers."^
Farmers next asked for long time rural credit. Congress
passed the Federal Farm Loan -^ct of 1916, setting up twelve Federal Laijid
10
1. "The Farmers' Campaign for Credit"

Banks, and priming the pump with the initial capital of .9,000,000. Thjp
effect of this new credit agency was to enable the Wyoming farmors or
any other farmer in any State in the Union to "borrow money on his land
at a rate of interest as low as that paid by the United States Steel
Corporation or any other giant industrial Corporation, "his act furn-
ished the farmer an unlimited supply of long time credit, at a low rate
of interest, on the installment plan of paying his mortgage, farmers
asked for credit running for a period of six months up to three years,
that is, intermediate credit, since this type of credit was not furn-
ished either by the Federal Reserve 3ystem or the Federal Farm Loan
System. Congress, in the year 1923, passed the Intermediate Credit Act
setting up twelve intermediate credit banks, and providing outright the
initial capital of <,?60 ,000,000. "his gives these banks a loaning power
of
, ;
'660,000,000. In this connection let it be remembered that agricul-
ture is the only industry financed by tax exempt bonds issued under off
cial supervision. Congress has made this provision for the bonds issue L
by the Federal Land Bank, the Joint Stock Land Banks and the Intermedial
e
Credit Banks. So the farmers credit needs are fully met. ..hether for
short time, long time, or intermediate credit.^
Farmers asked for a form of credit that would be specifi-
cally adapted to co-operative marketing. In response Congress passed
the United States arehouse Act of 1916 (and amended July 24, 1919 and
February 23, 1923)
•
The Farmers asked for tariff protection, so when the last
tariff was passed in 1922 the farmers practically wrote their own sched-J.
ales.
1. "1923 Year dook of Agriculture"

The farmers asited for good roads. aid the Federal id to
roads is now talcing hundreds of millions of dollars from the rational
Treasury and putting surfaced highways in reach of every farmer in the
United States. The farmers wanted "better mail service and the Aural
Free Delivery of mail was established, supported by Federal taxes, it I
is the only part of the post office service conducted at a financial
less. The farmers asked for a curb on big business and the Federal
Government passed the x'acker and Stock Yards ..ct and the Grain Futures
Act, regulating for the farmer the terminal marketing of his live stock
and his grain. The farmer wanted the right to combine and regulate the
flow of commerce, with an exemption from the penalties of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. They obtained this request.
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton iLet, with its famous
"Section 6" giving the farmers preferential treatment.
To give the farmer yet further protection from the Anti-
trust laws, Congress in 1922 passed the Capper—Yolstead Act, entitled
"An act to authorize associations of producers of agricultural products.
This law permits farmers to form combines with or without capital stock,j
and for various purposes, without coming under the Law of the Sherman
1
The farmer has not been neglected by the Federal Government
fcoite the opposite. Ho other class has received such favors, privileges
benefits -nd services.
The Farm Board has warned that the tractor and the combine
jiave brought into production vast regions that have not been used before
1. "Capper-Vol stead Act and Explanation of Act"
Public - Ete. 146 — 67th Congress
r
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and tracts comprising from 400 to 4000 acros are the most economical
units for wheat raising today. They are making competition by the own-
ers of smaller and more expensive farms and ranches extremely difficult.
These "bills will he discussed later in detail.
.rtECENT DBVSLOHZEiira S IN FARM BELIEF
Congress has finally more or less successfully come to the
relief of the farmers' distress by the passage of the agricultural mar-
keting Act of June 1929 which resulted in the establishment of the Fed-
eral Farm doard. -he unemployment problem, far from being a strictly
urban phenomenon, embraces agriculture, in former times a surplus of
labor in the cities of the United States was easily drawn off into the
country, and became a force for national development. Today the coun-
tries look to the cities to absorb a rural labor surplus, in which are
numerous individuals not accustomed to thinking of themselves as a part
of the nation's labor supply. For the first time in -jnerican History,
our unemployed have nov/here to go* If they are in the cities, they can
not flee to the land, because our farms already produce more than can bo
satisfactorily sold, if they are on the farms, they cannot go to the
cities unless they wish to lengthen the bread lines. Bvery-vhere the
pov.^r to produce increases faster than the power to consume, and produc-
tion capacity runs to waste while people starve. On all sides is raise<.
the cry that production must be curtailed. This is demanded, not out o:
perverseness
,
though it may seem perverse to suggest curtailed produc-
tion in a needy world, but as a result of our inability to make consump-
tion keep pace with it.
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About 40 years ago, Congress created the federal Depart-
ment of Agriculture, which is now devoting much of its tine and many
millions of its dollars to very direct and specific aid to farmers.
To he sure, Congress has in more recent years created a Department of
Commerce and a Department of Labor. But no one has ever heard of the
Department of Labor sending men into the field to help organize labor
unions, or of a Department of Commerce helping organize combines among
the capitalists, -he field work of the Department of Agriculture in
promoting co-operative organizations among farmers is now one of the
major activities of the department.
In the past 100 years the United States in common with al]|
commercial countries of the world, experienced five major economic de-
pressions, -hese occurred in the years 1819, 1873, 1893 and 1920.
Between these major crises came minor depressions. Owing to the defec-
tive credit and inadequate transportation facilities, the earlier paniojs
were more severe than the later ones, -he panic of 1920 was quickly
weathered by our industrial and commercial interests, but not so by agri-
culture, -he world wide post war depression has left American agricul-
ture, or some parts of ~merican agriculture, below par when compared
with the general economic life of the nation. Hence, the present demarl|i
for "economic equality" for agriculture. Certain facts may new be pre-
sented showing the extent and the causes of the agricultural depression.
The essence of the matter may be stated very briefly in these simple
words; American agriculture enjoyed a ten year boom, a period of rapid
and great price inflation ending in 1920, this was followed by a rapid

md great price deflation — these are the big facts in the story. Overj-
(xpansion of activity and indebtedness under the stimulus of war time
Lrtificial prosperity have produced agricultural depression.
The i.-cHary-Haugen ^ill and several other hills during the
>ast six years have been holding out the promise of .''arm relief,
'l'his
;tct may he cited as the "Surplus control Aet% The hill, as it passed
Congress in February 1927 is in brief surplus control, according
to its
ran provisions. Yet the exact meaning of this bill is a matter
of almodjb
•miversal uncertainty.
1 The two earlier .xKary-Haugen bills were frankl|r
•>rice fixing measures, and were defeated in Congress largely
for that
:<eason. This bill makes no direct reference to price fixing,
yet it was
vetoed by the -resident largely on the grounds that it is also a price
:ixing measure. There has unfortunately followed much quibbling
over
he phrase "price fixing" since the veto message, in reality,
price fix
:ng is not the touch-stone by which to test this measure. Its whole
pur
]Ose, effect, and operation must be examined critically and the bill
rust stand or fall by its success or failure to meet this broad
test.
! herefore the following outline will designate that the provisions of
this
£
1 ill are all grouped under the five main heads:
A, Title of the, BiUi, B. Declaration .ftfi PeMsy q C. Farm Relief ;
]. Administrative Machinery: E. Finances.
The title of this bill states three broad purposes: —
1. To establish a Federal Farm Board
2. To aid in orderly marketing
3. To aid in control and disposition of surplus
1. "Farm Relief" — James Boyle
2. "Farm Relief" — James Boyle
c
16
Congress names six specific objects:
1. To promote orderly marketing
2. xo that end, to provide for control and dis-
position of surplus
3. Ho enable producers to stabilize market prices
4. To preserve advantageous domestic markets
5. To minimize speculation
6. To encourage co-operative marketing
Three distinct and separate forms of relief are offered
"by this bill, and each an unwise governmental commercial activity,
many farmers? The hill selects six commodities and calls them "basic",
the theory apparently being that these six do represent either the bulK
of our farm products or a majority of our farmers. The importance of
these six commodities is very greatly exaggerated. Two of them may be
dismissed as insignificant from the national standpoint, — tobacco ,
occupying less than one-fifth of one per cent of our farm land; r ice ,
less than one-tenth of one per cent. Wheats featured in every LIcNary-
Haugen bill as the great American crop, has a total value of only six
per cent of our annual agricultural output. Cotton, occupies an area
of less than five per cent of our farm land. The corn crop derives its
importance from being marketed not as corn but in the form of hogs and
cattle. ..hen the relative importance of our various crops is once
grasped, it becorr.es evident that this bill does hurt more farmers than
I namely
:
1.
2.
3.
Dealing with surplus
Loaning money
Insuring prices
Does this plan benefit a few farmers at the expense of
it helps.
There are two aspects of this problem which now claim our
rC
attention: "What per cent of the farm output is consumed as raw material
in further agricultural operations? What is the rank of our important
crops on the basis of their value?"
The corn crop is a good example of one farm product being
used as raw material for further farm production. 85fo of this crop is
fed to animals (40^ of it to hogs alone). Only 1.5;o is exported as
corn. Therefore, elevating the price of corn by the operations of this
bill would simply put an increased burden on the farmers now using 85$
of the corn as raw material. The bill would not offer "relief", but
more trouble to this branch of American agriculture.
1
However, it is the dairy interests and the poultry interests
that would suffer most under this act.
Therefore, when our six million farmers are viewed as the
consumers of 40% of our agricultural products, in part as food, in parti
as clothing, and in part as raw material for further production, it is
clear that they suffer in the end a net loss by having the prices eleva-
ted on wheat and corn, hogs, cotton, rice, and tobacco. So this bill
"to help" the farmer, does mean, in practice, help for a few farmers at
the expense of the many farmers. And when it is further remembered tha
;
the bill proposed to cripple and partly destroy the two basic industries;
of dairy and poultry in order to lift up two other industries with only
80fo of their importance, the dangerous character of this bill is appar-
ent. The majority of our farmers would be victims, not beneficiaries of
this measure.
The Department of Agriculture in the 1925 Year Book speaks
l
r
. "Hew Republic" — April 1930
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of the growth of the free broadcast inn; service furnished to farmers:
The Department made its first experiment with radio in
1920. Since then there has been a great development in the use by the
farmers of this new means of communication. A survey made by the county
agricultural agents in 1923 indicated there were about 145,000 radio
sets on farms throughout the country. In 1924 the estimated number had
jumped to 365,000 and in 1925 to 553,000. This increase of 300 per cent
is evidence that the farmer appreciates the broadcasting service provided
for him.
A partial and very incomplete inventory of the activities
md services and aid of the farmers are listed in the 1925 Year Book of
1
jLgriculture includes the following:
1. Barberry eradication
2. Extension service
3. Foot and mouth disease eradication
4. Fighting the insect pests
5. Suppression of European fowl pests
6. Campaign against Animal Tuberculosis
7. Federal Heat inspection
8. Cattle tick eradication
9. Hog Cholera eradication
10. Fighting the Boll v/eevil
11. Discoveries in the Bureau of Chemistry
12. Plant quarantine
13. Soil surveys
14. Predatory animal control
One dominant school of thought contends that reduction of
acreage is of prime importance, to wheat and cotton, the crops in a
ally vulnerable position. The necessity of such action, it is asserted
is dictated by the inexorable law of supply and demand. There are
farmers who believe this unwritten law is being ruthlessly employed to
1. "Year Book of Agriculture" —— 1925 (U. S. D. A.)

ADDENDA: Co-oporative i-arketing
America's co-operative marketing trail is long; it winds back
to the middle of the last century, farmers "began "by developing cc -op-
erative marketing inside small circles, sometimes handling several cro]jjs
in one local association. Later they made larger circles to include
many locals, often taking in all of the co-operatives handling a parti-
cular commodity in a district or region. Then still larger circles
were made and several regionals were federated into terminal marketing
agencies* All of this was helpful hut did not go far enough to reach
the main objectives. Finally, the passage of the agricultural market-
ing act made it possible to draw a single or master circle big enough
to take in all of a commodity handled by co-operatives, including local
districts, regionals, and terminals. Eventually, this is expected to
do away with competition among co-operatives handling the same commod-
ity. V/ith the majority of producers inside the master commodity circle
where the sales are controlled by a single national marketing organiza-
tion, farmers may be able to put agriculture on a basis of economic
equal ity with other industries.
Various Federal and State agricultural agencies are co-opera-
ting on a national educational program designed to familiarize farmers
with the new developments in co-operative marketing and to encourage
more of them to become members of co-operatives. The agencies co-opera
ting in this correlated educational movement include the United States
Department of Agriculture, Federal and State extension groups, land-gra|.t
colleges and universities, the Federal 3oard for Vocational Education,
State departments of agriculture, general farm organizations and farm-

ors 1 co-operatives.
The co-operative market ins agencies are financed "by the inter-
mediate credit hanks, commercial hanks, and the Federal Farm Board.
Producers of more than 40 farm crops have heen definitely as-
sisted in a practical way hy the agr icultural marketing act through then
co-operatives. The new law, passed in June 192S has intensified the
farmers' interest in co-operative marketing. Farmers are gradually con
trolling a greater volume of their products as they move through market
ing channels to the processor or ultimate consumer. By collective actifl;
growers are extending their marketing system, strengthening their posi-
tion in "bargaining on central markets, developing a credit system that
r/ill make them more independent, and improving their chances of adjust-
ing production to prevent troublesome surpluses.
Officially the United States is definitely committed to the
principles of co-operative marketing. The policy of the Federal Govern-
nent to aid with men and money in the establishment of producer-owned
and producer-controlled co-operative marketing organizations is enabling
farmers to take another essential step — the development of national
commodity-selling agencies.
More than a million farmers have been aided by the agricultura]
Marketing act. All farmers, no matter where they live in the United
States, may market their crops through the local, regional, terminal,
aid national co-operative organizations that are being developed in ac-
jordance with the provisions of this Federal law.
Seven national agencies have been established by co-operatives
18b

with the assistance of the Federal Farm Board. Six of these are sales
agencies. Five already are operating, marketing grain, cotton, live-
stock, wool and mohair, and pecans.
Foundations are "being laid for the "building of other national
marketing organizations wherever they are needed.
There are 12,000 farmer-owned and controlled co-operative asso-
ciations in the United States, according to estimates in June 1930. Thp
membership of these associations totals approximately 3,100,000 repre-
senting about 2,000,000 farmers. Some producers are members of 2, 3,
4, or 5 organizations, which accounts for the difference between the
membership and the number of farmers.
-
16c
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reduce them to serfdom, but reliable statistics prove the contrary.
the
..hatever/produce may be, the price paid for it is determined by the qanati-
tity of it on the market and the public need of it. The supply of whea;
in this country and in the world greatly exceeds the demand. The same
is equally true of cotton. Because of the surpluses, the value has
dropped to the level that the cheaper users will pay.
Study reveals that the principal reasons for the surpluses
are increased acreage and the mechanization of agriculture. The area
devoted to wheat raising in the United States last year was larger by
14,000,000 acres than it was before the .orld ./ar. Kansas alone put twft
million more acres than it ever did before. The inevitable has happen-!
ed. The carry-over totals £75,000,000 bushels or an amount equal to
about one-third of the entire crop, with the price falling below the
level at v:hich many farmers can pay expenses. It is highly significant
that the carry-over has increased rapidly in recent years, being only
90,000,000 bushels in 1926 • Thus there has been three hundred per cent
increase in this particular in three years. The situation would not be
so desparate if foreign markets were open to the surplus, but the truth
is that the world acreage — exclusive of -.ussia, which was once the
greatest exporter of wheat — exceeds that before the war by 42,000,000
acres. This tremendous expansion of industry had built up a world accum-
ulation of 489,000,000 bushels as compared with 272,000,000 bushels in
1
.926.
The expansion of agriculture has come simultaneously with
bn industrial transition. Here, too, labor saving devices have been
1. "Year Book of Agriculture" ~ 1930 (U.S.D.A.)
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installed. These devices have released human "beings from arduous eff or
Diets have changed as occupations have become easier, making fat and
muscle producing foods a smaller factor than ever before. The lighter
diets so generally advocated by physicians have affected the staple
agricultural crops adversely and at the very time of their expansion.
Official figures show that, whereas the pre-war individual consumption
of wheat was five "bushels annually the present consumption is 4 and 2/1
bushels. The shrinkage on such a "basis totals nearly 100,000,000
"bushels per year.
There is ample proof, however, that farmers benefit when
they do resort to co-operation. The California ,/alnut Growers' Associa
tion, controlling 90 per cent of the walnuts produced in this country,
sold the entire 1929 crop, the second largest in history, at firm pricejs.
The dairy industry, which has many co-operative organizations, has es-
caped much of the depression obtaining in other agricultural enter-
prises. A third example is provided by the California citrus industry,
seventy-five per cent of which is controlled "by the California Fruit
Growers' Exchange, Through organization, co-operation has permitted ttafe
handling of nearly a normal volume at gocd prices.
Early last year there appeared in the Hew Republic an ar til-
de in which Mr. Robert Stewart discussed the possibility of agricultural-
al relief through tariff legislation. "The Farmer", he concluded, "wil
jreceive little real help from tariff legislation proposed "by Congress."
Some persons have criticized this conclusion for being based on insuffi-
cient evidence. ISr* Stewart, they say, took only commodities that were
2. "New Republic" Hay 1950
3/ "New Republic" June 1930
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particularly favorable to his case — though they, to be sure, provide
44 per cent of the farmers' cash income — wheat, cotton, corn, hogs,
tobacco and rice.
In contrast to Stawart, another article discussed these
four commodities — dairy products, eggs, wool and flax —which are
cited by tariff advocates as the best examples of effective protection.
Together these commodities provide 21 per cent of The farmers' cash, in-
come, Consequently, this article presents the best that can truthfully
be said for agricultural tariffs. If, after this supplementary study,
the indications are that farmers will not be materially aided by the
tariff legislation about to be passed by Congress there can be no ex-
cuse for saying that only one side of the argument has been presented."
Butter production in the United States amounts to over two
billion pounds a year, with a total farm value of ^800,000,000. or eight
times as much as the cash income from rice, three times as much as from
tobacco, twice as much as from corn and as much as the cash income frcmi
vheat . The present tariff on butter is 12 cents a pound. Under this
tariff, butter producers received approximately 5.7 cents a pound above
bhe London or world market price in 1929. Kence, the tariff of 12 cents
7as not then fully effective, but was nearly 50 per cent so. The month
when New York prices were the highest above London prices was Larch,
frith 10 cents,: the lowest month was November, with 1.5 cents above
London. The total annual benefit from the butter tariff amounted in 192)9
o approximately ^90,000,000. Since 80 per cent of cur farmers keep cows,
this tariff benefit helps 4,988,000 farmers, in proportion to the number
1. "New Republic" I .arch 1930

of cows they keep and the amount of their products marketed. Assuming
this .'90,000,000. to be divided equally among them, each producing
farmer received ^18. benefit in 1929.^"
Under present conditions the twelve cent tariff is practi-i
cally prohibitive, less than 3,000,000 pounds (about 0.1 per cent of the
comestic production) being imported in 1929. During the same period
nearly 4,000,000 pounds of butter were exported, leaving an actual net
export of 1,000,000 pounds.
In 1928, dairymen received a benefit of about $125,000,000.
as compared with the ^90, 000, 000. benefit in 1929. This 28;2 decrease in
1929 was primarily due to our increased production, which depressed domes-
tic prices. At the -present time (March 1950) domestic prices are actually
below prices of Danish butter in London.
These data indicate that because cf the present tendency tjo
increase domestic production (creamery butter production in 1922 was
1,153,515,000 pounds; in 1929 it was 1,513,580,300 pounds), the proposed
tariff increase will be of no benefit to dairymen, and furthermore, they
indicate that farmers will experience even more than 28^ decline in tari-
1
iff benefits in 1930.
The House bill increases the duty of £.5 cents per gallon
on milk to five cents per gallon, and increases the present duty of
twenty cents per gallon on cream to 48 cents per gallon. These increased
rates will particularly prohibit milk and cream imports from Canada,
since they offset the price differential which ITew York now holds over
Montreal, vhe importation of cream from Canada into the Boston market
1. "New Republic" - March 1930
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amounted to 15;^ of the total boston supply in 1926.
Shutting out Canadian ir.ports will result in a shifting of
the source of 15fo of boston's cream supply from Canada to the middle
west, i'he price of cream will have to increase enough tc compel boston
consumers to pay the freight rates of 14 cents a gallon from Chicago to
Boston. New England dairymen will benefit directly "by this increased
price, and I.Iidwest farmers will "benefit indirectly by probable better
butter prices brought about through the removal of between three and
four million gallons of creams, or the equivalent of between 14 and 16 1
million pounds of butter, from the butter market to be used for sweet
cream consumption in the -.ast. Thus, the proposed tariff legislation
increasing the duties on milk and cream will undoubtedly prove benefi-
cial to united States dairymen generally. (It is interesting to note
that President Hoover raised the milk and cream duties the full fifty
per cent allowed by presidental proclamation on Iaayl4, 1929, to be
effective on June 14, 1929. This makes the present duty on milk 3.75
1
cent per gallon and the cre.-m duty 50 cents per gallon.
The House bill makes all cheese dutiable at "seven cents
per pound, net less than 37.5 per cent ad valorem". This increases
the duty on bmerican and other cheeses except Swiss, since they now
carry a duty of five cents per pound, but not less than 25 per cent ad
valorem. She duty on the only kind of cheese on which an increase could
materially help producers, namely, Swiss, was actualljr decreased, for
Swiss cheese already carries a duty of "seventy-five cents per pound,
not less than 37.5% ad valorem", -he increased duty on all cheese except
1. "New republic" ...ay 1929
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Swiss vail probably be useless to producers, because imports of Jvmerican
cheese, the only competitive type of which we produce appreciable amounlts
(are now now a price determining factor, had the duty on Swiss cheese
been increased, it would have increased the price now received by domes-
tic producers of Swiss cheese by about 70 per cent of the amount of the!
increased duty. Since Wisconsin produces ninety per cent of the Swiss
cheese of the United States, the benefits would have gone primarily to
this ofae state. As the bill now stands, cheese producers will receive
practically no benefit from the proposed tariff legislation."^"
The United States produced 1,900,000,000 dozens of eggs in
1924, which had a farm value of approximately |547,000,000. Sggs pro- I
vide about 3-§ per cent of the farmers' cash income and are produced in i
varying amounts by 90% of our farmers, "he House bill increases the
duty on eggs in the shell from 6 cents per dozen to 10 cents per dozen,
and on eggs, egg yolk, and egg albumen, frozen or otherwise prepared or
2
preserved from 6 cents per pound to eight cents per pound. The bill
does not change the duty on dried egg products, the principal competing
*roup. In 1929 imports of dried eggs, dried albumen, dried yolks and eggs
imported in any other form, converted to their equivalent of eggs in the
shell, totaled 49,000,000 dozen plus the albumen from 17,5000,000 dozen*
Exports of eggs from the United States for 1929 totaled 12,000,000 dozen;
leaving a net import of 37,000,000 dozen and the albumen equivalent of
17,500,000 more. At the present time, 80,000,000 dozen eggs are broken
3ut annually in the United States and either frozen or sold in liquid
form. If the imports of dried, frozen and other eggs are prohibited,
1. "New Republic" March 1930
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the domestic market for breaking will be increased by about twenty per
cent
This withdrawal of approximately 37,000,000 dozen eggs
yearly will supply a market for about twenty per cent of our present
production of "dirties", "cracks" and undersized eggs, which are not
now broken because the Chinese egg products undersell us and take away
our market. The removal of this number of poor grade eggs might possi-
bly cause an increase of as much as one or two cents per dozen in the
price of our better grade eggs, .-hile the annual benefit on the total
production would be an appreciable amount, ^8,000,000. the average
benefit to producers (except for a few large commercial poultrymen)
would be very small, since poultry is kept by most farmers as a side
line for getting pocket money with which to buy groceries. Assuming that
the benefits were distributed equally among the 5,505,617 farmers keep-
ing chickens, the benefit per producing farmer would be approximately
seventy cents annually. This item may be a factor indeed. ^
The United States produced an average of 139,000,000 pounds
Of scoured wool per year for the period 1923 - 1928. .Tool provides about
I per cent of the farmers* income. The present duty of thirty-one cents
per scoured pound gives the wool growers in Texas, Montana, yoming,
|ltah, California, Ohio and other states an annual average benefit of
^45,000, 000. Vhere are about 430,700 farmers or seven per cent of all
our farmers keeping sheep. This benefit of .,343,000, 000, from the wool
uty is not divided equally among them, but goes primarily to a few largea
ranchers. The House bill proposes to increase the rate to thirty-four cents
1. "New Republic" March 1930

per pound. Under this rate, the benefits will probably total about
^47,000,000.!
In general, the tariff on wool is three-fourths to fully-
effective, varying somewhat with different grades of wool, "he proposed
three per cent increase provided in the House bill will benefit wool
producers between two and three cents per pound, The chief criticisms
of the wool duty are that only seven per cent of our farmers keep sheep,
and that the benefits go principally to a few large ranchers.
The flax crop of the United States in 1927 was 26,583,000
bushesl, having a farm value of $49 ,373,000. or 0.6fo of the farmers'
total cash income. Approximately 104,000 farmers produce flaxseed in
North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and l.ontana, where on many farms
jwheat has been partly given up for this more profitable crop. The pre-
sent duty of forty cents per bushel on flaxseed yields producers an an-
nual benefit of .#5,600,000. or $5« per farm. The House bill increases
the duty to 56 cents per bushel. Under this rate, the probable annual
benefit will be ..^8,250,000. or ^78. per producing farm. 3etter prices
for flaxseed will induce some shifting among farmers of these four
wheat states from wheat to flax, thereby decreasing to some extent the
present United States wheat surplus. That this shifting will account
for but a small amount of the total wheat surplus is obvious. The ap-
pearance of flax wilt when flax seed follows flax seed necessitates a
jcrop rotation in which flaxseed crops on the same land are four or five
years apart. This had a very positive control over actual and potential
Ijflaxseed acreage. Nevertheless, a tariff on flax is very beneficial to
1. "New Republic" I.Iarch 1930

the 104,000 flax growers and, to a very limited extent, indirectly ben-J
1
eficial to wheat growers.
The facts here presented indicate that even in those cases
where the tariff if considered to he most effective on agricultural pro-
ducts, increases now proposed "by Congress will not materially influence
the farm situation. Dairy interests will "benefit from the increased
egg tariff, "but the production of eggs for market is such a small side I
line on most farms that the "benefits occurring to each producing farmer!
will he a small amount, 'i'he wool producers will probably benefit by
between three-fourths and the full amount of the increase in the wool
duty, but a few ranchers will get most of it, -he increase in the flaxj
duty will materially help fjax grov/ers but they comprise but 1.6% of the!
American farmers.
June, 1929, the Congress passed a law in benefit of American
agriculture named the "Agricultural Marketing Act", with the intent as
defined in the preamble, "to establish a Federal Farm Board to promote
the effective merchandising of agricultural commodities in interstate
and foreign commerce and to place agriculture on a basis of economic
equality with other industries. The necessity was political. All the
premises were experimental.
At the first meeting of the Federal Farm Board members,
which consisted of eight men with the Secretary of Agriculture, President
Koover said to them: "I invest you with responsibility, authority and
resources such as never before have been conferred by our Government inl
assistance to any industry." That was very strong notice yet it passed
1. "Hew Republic" — March 1950

as a statement of relative fact. Its significance was lost in a sensi
of relief. One more board had "been created to absorb a national dis-
traction — namely, in this case, the farm problem.
V<'e had long been used to the spectacle of Congress, itself
at an impasse, delegating original powers of government to boards and
commissions. Somehow, it had worked. If, in this instance, the powers
were greater than had ever been delegated to a board before, that was,
perhaps, necessary from the magnitude and complexity of the situation
to be acted upon. She farm problem was not solved. 3ut the problem of
how to solve it — that was solved. A board with a mandate to find the
solution and ^500, 000,000. free in its hand, .-hat more could agricul-
ture reasonably expect; especially since it had no perfect or unanimous
solution of its own? A scientific approach at last. Pact finding, re-
search, modern business principles to be laid upon agriculture. These
were innocent reactions. But even among those who &ne% the extreme posj-
sibilities of the law and were fearful of them, there was, perhaps, not
one who could have imagined that ten months later such paragraphs would
be appearing in the daily grain-market reports as the following from
the Hew York Times of April 15th.
1
"Chicago—The wheat market showed relative steadiness earlj-
today, only to break three cents from the top later, because of selling,
attributed to local professionals and Eastern longs On today's
break, the buying of Hay wheat by houses that usually act for the GoverjA-
nent gave the trade the impression that the federal Tarm Board was taking
pack the grain it sold on the recent bulge. The Government with 50, 000 J-
1. "New York Times" —April 15, 1930
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000 bushels of wheat on its hands.'
Is the Chicago wheat pit hexing itself with wild inven-
tions? Not at all. In the company of professional speculators, the
Government is buying and selling futures in the wheat pit. The Govern-)
ment's speculative position in the market, bow much money it will bet
out of the United states treasury against all comers on the future
price of v/heat and what it will do with a cash-grain corpse when the
wheat itself is delivered to it on future contracts, are suddenly as
natural matters with which wheat-pit speculators are obliged to con-
cern themselves by rumor, gossip and deduction,'''
Surprise, if any, is from not knowing what the law is.
The Agricultural Marketing -^ct of benign physiognomy authorizes the
federal rarm ^oard to speculate in wheat. ?or this purpose it sets up
a dummy corporation to be its creature. This dummy has no mind, no re-j
sponsibility , no capital—nothing whatever to lose. iThen the federal
Farm 3oard says for it to do so, it borrows money from the Government
and casts it into the wheat pit. it buys not the wheat but the options
or futures—meaning the contract to receive wheat at a future date.
This it does, of course, tc support the price of wheat in the pit. If
the price rises, it may sell out in the pit at a loss or actually re-
ceive the grain and have that on its hands to sell. The la? provides
that if the dummy loses the S overnment ! s money it need not repay the
loan. That is to say, the loss is charged to the United States Treas-
ury and there is the end of it. if, by luck, there is a profit, the
dummy may keep it. ^11 the Government can get back in that case is the
the loan at a low rate of Interest.
1. ,! Vorld's /ork" February 1931

To all this activity the federal Farm 3oard denies the
name of speculation, -he dummy is called a stabilization corporation.
therefore, its operations in the wheat pit are stabilizing operations,
tending to stabilize the price. Jut that is what professional speculaJ
tors have always said of their own operations — that they tend to sta-j
bilize the price and that such is the true function of speculation.
2he government is neither miller nor wareheus eman . it has
no use for actual crain. .hen the federal Fajm Board, through its dummy,
enters the wheat pit against professional speculators and begins dealing
in futures, it is speculating in the price, with intent to influence it|»
Otherwise what it does is without meaning or point; and otherwise the
law would not, as it does, discuss the consequences of profit and loss.
To stand much on a change of name, calling it stabilization
instead of speculation, is puerile apology for the federal Farm Board,
for its acts, for the law itself, it is better to take the fact in its
bald character and look then to the theory and intent of the amazing
1
transactions now taking place in the name of farm relief.
heat is only the most vivid episode. i'he Federal .'arm
3oard is equally authorized to speculate in other agricultural commodi-
ties and tc employ government money in ways direct and indirect to af-
ect prices. Almost unawares, we have entered a road of original epi-
sodes. IT© one knows the way of it or the end of it. 2he undertaking is|
|o improve the relative economic status of agriculture by government in-
tervention, --ark the word "relative", in relation to what is the eco-
nomic status of the agricultural part of the population to be improved?
1. "Federal Farm Board Circular, i,o. I" Ilarch 1930
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.hy, in relation to the economic status of the urban and industrial
part, on the ground that the disparity between tthem has become chronic
The law begins with a declaration of policy, which is "to place agricul-
ture on a basis of economic equality with other industries". By act cf
legislation.
Radical departures do often take place in dimness and hastjle
.
The most adventurous piece of economic legislation in our history was
enacted at a time when the public mind was inert from sheer weariness,
-he controversy over farm relief has reduced it to a state of complai-
sance. Everybody was willing that something should be tried. Only the
extremists in Congress were alert. 'j-hey seized the opportunity to load
the law with strange and extraordinary powers, partly, no doubt, in a
spirit of sabotage, if the law was rejected for that reason, so much
the better, for then the agitation could gc on; if, on the other hand,
the law was accepted in spite of what they had done to it, they would
have their hands on the Treasury door knob.
Those who deeply disliked the extreme features of the act
were, nevertheless, persuaded that they had either to reject it as a
whole, or witness the shipwreck of a plan for farm relief, otherwise
sound, for which the country had been anxiously waiting. This or noth-
ing, after all that had been promised, would be a political disaster.
Joreovor, they said the federal rarm Board was invested with powers of
discretion. A sound federal >'arm Board would work only that part of thtt
taw that was sound and necessary to move the benign intention; the un-
|
sound part it need not work at all, or, if ever, then only to meet an

unforeseen emergency.
The total result was a law in conflict with itself — a
law with two heads facing opposite ways, each with its own intention.
One was the intention to assist agriculture to help itself. That may
be called the Hoover idea. The other was the intention to crash the
United States Treasury for the farmer. This may be called the radical
farm-bloc idea.
Then what did astonishingly proceed from the law and the
reasons in case thereof can be set forth in a fair light. It is, first
of all, necessary to understand this conflict and see it in the law.
Under the Hoover idea—which is very simple—agriculture
needs first of all, to rationalize production instead of letting it rurj
wild, and then to market its products in an orderly systematic manner
To these ends, three means—namely, organization, capital and farmer-
owner physical facilities. Organization is the first term. There is
no way to rationalize production or to bring order and system into mar-
keting without organization on a very large scale. For many reasons,
agriculture had never been able to organize itself. The time had
come for the Federal Government to take it by the hand and patiently
lead it through association to a state of self-government.
Thus President Hoover, in his first words to the Federal
Farm Board: "Your fundamental purpose must be to determine the fact and
to find solution to a multitude of agricultural problems; among them to
more nearly adjust production to need; to create permanent busiiiess in-
stitutions for marketing, which owned and controlled by the farmers,

shall be so wisely devised and soundly founded and well managed that
they, by effecting economies and giving such stability, will grow in
strength over the years to come, 'through these efforts we may establish
;o the farmer an equal opportunity in our economic system with other in-
1
jlustry."
He was thinking of agriculture as it might lie entirely
onder a system of co-operative associations, like the trade associations
)f industry, only with more legal rights and privileges, including the
right to limit production by agreement, immunity from the anti-trust
ict, and the privilege to borrow money direct from the government at a
Low rate of interest; each association to own its physical facilities,
such as terminals, clearing houses, storage plants and selling agencies,
ind to be free of government interference when, in time, it could take
jontrol of its own affairs and go alone. All as it was contemplated in
the act, down to the details of a vast pyramidial structure like this:
First, at the top of the pyramid, the Federal Farm Board
vith a revolving fund of half a billion dollars tc be loaned and reloan-|
ad downward to the base.
Next, below the Federal Farm Board, a system of executive
30-operatives representing agriculture by regions or commodities — one
for wheat, one for cotton, one for tobacco, one for livestock, one for
iairy products, and so on»
Beneath each one of these executive national associations
any necessary number of local or unit co-operative associations, drawing
aid and benefit to the soil from the Federal Farm Board at the ton.
1. "Time Magazine" — April 1930

Loans "by the Federal Farm Board frcm the ,500,000,000. re-
volving fund run not to individual farmers direct out, in the first in-
stance, to the executive or national associations and through these to
the local co-operatives; and these loans—all repayable—may "be for sucjh
purposes as to "buy, lease and build physical facilities for handling,
at©ring or processing agricultural commodities; to promote co-operative
organization, to assist effective merchandising in any way, and to en-
able co-operatives to lend to their members more money din their crops
than they can "borrow at a hank.
This scheme undoubtedly would work, provided the farmer
embraced it. Otherwise not. Unless a very large majority of farmers
were willing, as individuals, to impose upon themselves the restraints
and discipline of co-operative effort, the Federal Farm Board, under al||L
this part of the law, would still be jjowerless to change the economic
status of agriculture. And that was what the extreme protagonists of
farm relief were thinking.
Now comes the radical farm-block idea. It is Section 9,
under the heading, Stabilization Corporations .'
1
' rJhose who are extreme-j
minded about farm relief have a cold eye for co-operation or for any-
thing that tends to limit the farmer's historic freedom of action, whicfln
includes the right to produce as he sees fit. From their point of viev
the demerit of the lav; up to this point was that Federal aid was con-
fined to co-operative associations of a certain character—namely, such
as would undertake to do more business with non-members than with mem-
bers, .ell
,
then, suppose a majority of farmers v;ere unwilling to bind
1. Farm Board "Questions and ^s\vers ,!
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their individual freedom in responsibilities of association. How was
government aid to reach such as these?
So they wrote into the act that wonderful dummy device named
the "stabilization corporation," Paragraph B of Section 9, reads: "Any
stabilization corporation for the purpose of controlling any sur-
plus in the commodity. .. .may prepare, purchase, handle, store, process
and merchandise, otherwise than for the account of its stock-holders or
members, any quantity of the agricultural commodity or its food product;
Note the phrase: "Otherwise than for the account of its stockholders o|
members." This aid shall not be confined to co-operative associations.
It is wide open to agriculture, co-operative or non-co-operative. All
limitations are off. Under Section 9, the Federal Farm Board, through
a stabilization corporation, may buy any quantity of an agricultural
commodity. It may engage in the packing business, or the milling busi-
ness, run a canning factory, or manufacture jellies. It may make a corf
tier in an agricultural commodity, with government money. Literally so.
As if they had foreseen the possibility of a corner, with thd
jovernment torn between farmers on one hand, and food buyers on the othflr,
the authors of Section 9 wrote into it this aspiration of restraint:
"Any stabilization corporation receiving loans under this subdivision fiflr
surplus -control operations shall exert every effort to avoid losses and
to secure profits, but shall not withhold any commodity from the domes-
tic market if the prices have become unduly enhanced, resulting in dis-
tress to domestic consumers."
But no way is suggested, no authority is set up, to determine
L. The Farm Board "Questions and Answers" Circular ITo. 1,
March 1930
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what \;ould be undue enhancement or what would constitute consumer dis-
tress. T.or is there anything in the law about what should be done in
the event, not impossible, that after having not the money from the
Government to make a corner in an agricultural commodity, and having
made it, the dummy stabilization corporation came alive with a farmer
mind of its own and defied the federal Farm Board's ideas of what woulRl
be undue enhancement or what would constitute consumer distress.
And for all these Section 9 purposes — specifically, to buy
and withhold agricultural commodities until the price is enhanced to a
point just this side of consumer distress — the Government directly
provides the money.
The Federal Farm Board's official interpretation of oectioi
9 is set forth in Circular ITumber I, entitled, "Questions and -jiswers",]
Questions 30 asks for the board's thoughts on stabilizat ion,^" The an»
swer is that the .tfoard thinks of stabilization in two terms:
First, there is normal stabilization, and everything the
Board does should tend in a cumulative manner to produce stability in
agriculture.
The Second term is different. TbM Board says, "The second
form of stabilization might be termed extraordinary or emergency oper-
ations, whereby, because of a large surplus of any commodity, the opers
tion would consist of buying and taking off in the market some consid-
erable part of the tonnage, so as to relieve the pressure in the hope
there would be a more favorable opportunity of aisposin;: of it.
This second, or emergency class of operation would, of course, be car-
1. The Federal Farm Board "Questions and -nswers" Circular Ko. I
March 1930

ried out strictly under the provisions of the --i.gr icultural F-arketing
Act, with money advanced by the 3oard, end if the final result of such
operation shows a loss or deficit, such loss will "be borne by the revolv-
ing fund." By the Government, that is to say.
^Surplus is the millstone, the price breaker, the evil measurt
Agriculture has never been£>le to control the surplus, for the simple
reason that is has never been able to rationalize production. ell,
neither is the law able to touch production, The Federal Farm Board
with all its powers cannot act upon production, that is to say, upon
surplus at the source, save by exhortation. One of its duties is to
exhort farmers to cease from producing excessively. Theoretically it
may withhold loans and other benefits from those who do in a wilful
manner produce an excess of any commodity, actually, nevertheless, a
surplus in being is a fact in itself and creates an emergency on which
the Federal Farm Board is obliged to act. If the Board should say to
the farmers, "Since iaiowingly you have again produced a surplus, you
must yourselves bear the loss of it," the farmers would say, "But for
this problem of surplus we should not need a Federal Farm Board. The
law tells you what to do about a surplus. That is what the lav was foi
Moreover, the law defines what a surplus is. It defines it
not as a quantity that has been unavoidably produced. How or why it
has been produced apparently does not matter. Flatly, the law says:
There shall be considered as a surplus for the purposes of
this .let any seasonal or year's total surplus, produced in the United
States and either local or national in extent, that is in excess of the
1. "Farm P.elief" James 3. Boyle

requirements for the orderly distribution of the agricultural commodity
or is in excess of the domestic requirements for such commodity.
Clearly, under the law it is the function of the stabiliza-
tion corporation, and the duty of the federal Farm Board acting througlj
the stabilization corporation, to do away with the surplus at any cost
and charge the loss to the Government. So at last the wicked surplus,
which, hitherto, -American agriculture has had to dump on foreign mar-
kets at the world price will be dumped on the Government, The theory
of dumping it on the Government is that when the Government has removec
the surplus quantity from the market, so that what remains of an agri-
cultural commodity will be «iust sufficient to satisfy the domestic
demand, then the domestic price will be the world -price plus the tarifJj
In the case of wheat, that is the world price plus forty-two cents a
bushel
.
Thus the law. How to see what has proceeded from it.
The Agricultural IJarketing Act was passed on June 15, 1929.
The federal i^arm Board took being thirty days later, beginning in June
and continuing through tiuly and August, there was tremendous excitement
in the wheat pit. The price advanced some times as much as six or eight
cents a day, and the total rise in these few weeks was fifty cents a
bushel — on rumors and expectations of what the Government to do under
the head of stabilization. The effect was what you would expect. In-
stead of selling their wheat on this rise, the farmers thought only of
holding it for a higher price.
The Department of -agriculture was of the same mind and urged
r
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farmers to hold their grain. In July, in fact, it launched what was
called a hold-your-^vheat campaign. All the government's price experts
said wheat at ,;1.50 a "bushel was too low. They could prove it with
reason and statistics, and did prove it with certainty to the satisfac
tion of the federal Farm 3oard, whereupon the Chairman announced that
the Board was in sympathy with the movement to withhold grain."*"
-hey were all wrong, -hey underestir.aated the amount of whea^
in the world, overestimated the world demand, and, of course, had no
pre-vision of the financial crash then imminent in .Vail Street, This
was "bound to have repercussions even in commodity markets.
As it turned out — as it will always turn out — the Govern].
ment T s opinion on the future of prices is no better than a private opi] .-
ion; there is this difference, however, when the Government gives fortlj.
an opinion and farmers have acted upon it, a moral responsibility is
created.
In October came the typhoon in ./all Street. The natural sequel
of a panic in the world of industry was heroically avoided, neverthe-
less, demand in all directions was retarded, there was an onset of un-
employment, commodity prices suffered, naturally, the price of wheat
would hove fallen s omewhat , but it fell violently, not only because of
the general economic disturbance but for the reason, also, that every-
body suddenly discovered the position of wheat itself to be much weaken
than had been represented by the Government. The Canadian wheat pools
were in trouble, with a large carry-over from the preceding crop, and
required help from their government, -here was "trouble also in Austral:
1. "Saturday evening x^ost" «;une 1930

and ..rgentina. ..ith these three countries pressing wheat for sale in
the world market and with unsold -.merican wheat at the same time pilind
up at all the export terminals until the railroads were obliged to s top
receiving it on their tracks, the situation "became serious.
'./hat did the farmer say? He said: "'.Then wheat was $1.50, thdl
Government told us to hold it. l!ow it is jl.25 and what is the Govern^
ment going to do about it?'"
There was the federal Farm .board, with half a billion dollars)
to support agricultural prices. What was it doing? Fact-finding, re-
searching, taking thought. But here was an emergency. Having said, irj
August, "The Board is in sympathy with the movement among farmers' or-
ganizations to withhold their wheat from market," had it no October re-
sponsibility at all?
Both the pressure and the logic were irresistible. On Octo-
ber 28, the Federal Farm Board said flatly that the price of wheat was
too low. The decline, it said, was owing partly to the rush of new
wheat to a glutted market and partly to the economic disturbance producelji
by the ".'/all Street disaster. "Wheat producers," it said, "should not bp
forced to sell on a market affected by these conditions."
Therefore, the Federal Farm Board acting through co-operative
associations of wheat growers would lend government money on wheat up t
its full market value, the basis to be ^1.25 a bushel for Ho. I Norther i
wheat at Minneapolis. There was then no reason why a farmer should se .1
his wheat. He could borrow the full market value of it. Suppose the
price went down, well then the Government might have the wheat and
welcome to it. But suppose the price went up, then the farmer could sel l
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pay back the Government, and keep the profit.
In announcing its policy the Board made this vast statement:
"The Board places no limit on the amount of government money to be so
loaned. ITearly ;100,000,000« is available for the purpose and, if ne-
cessary, the Board will ask Congress to appropriate more." Maybe you
would think, as many people did think, even, apparently, the federal
Farm Board that when the Government has undertaken to leny any amount
of money on wheat at a certain price a further decline is impossible.
How could wheat go below the price? well, it did. It went very much
lower, for two reasons: One was that the loans were limited to co-opeij
ative associations of wheat growers; the other was that not even the
Government can determine the selling price of wheat. The whole world
does that.
As the price continued to fall, for reasons over which the
Federal Farm Board had no control, it was necessary to take another
step. The Board loaned liovermnent money to co-operative associations
for the purpose of actually buying wheat from member farmers at the
loan value of vl.25 a bushel, and to buy it at the same time in the opa^n
market at the market value. Loans for these two purposes were made by
the Federal Farm Board principally to and through the Farmers' national
Grain Corporation. This was the first national commodity, co-operative
sales association to be set up under the lav. .hen it was organized, ip.
October, the Federal Farm Board said: "This corporation provides a
medium through which the Federal Farm Board may make loans to cc-opera-|
tive grain marketing associations both for current marketing purposes
and fnr the acquirement of physical facilities.^"
1. "Farmers Build Their Marketing Machinery" — Bulletin No. 3,
December 1930
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The corporation proceeded to support the price of wheat with
"buying orders. An Associated Press News dispatch from St. Paul, rebru-
ary 6, read: "The farmers' National Grain Corporation has become the
heaviest single buyer of grain in the country through its purchases in
North /estern markets to "(bolster faing wheat prices." In the same weels
the grain report in the Financial Chronicle said: "Wheat declined 5 to
6^ cents owing to the dullness of the export trade and the largeness of
the surplus stock in this country. The co-operatives keep busy buying
car lots of wheat in Minneapolis and Kansas City, but it looks like a
futile gesture for the time being.""1'
Here is a singular spectacle. Co-operative selling associati jns
buying the commodity they have to sell. Their problem is how to dispose
of a surplus. But because the price is too low, they will buy the sur-|
plus. As a producer, the farmer is, naturally, a seller. But since he
is unwilling to sell at the current price, he himself turns buyer. ..hat
they were thinking, of course, was that as buyers they could advance th i
price and sell out. That is what professional speculators are supposed
to do. ..hy shouldn't farmers be able to do it? Besides, it was the
Government's money, and if it all went wrong, the Government would hold
the bag.
But for all of this, the market price of wheat went on fallin|
Only the market price. There were now two prices. One was the market
price and the other ..as the government price, and the spread between thttm
firas some times as much as eighteen cents. The Government was still lend-
ing money on wheat on the basis of yl.25 at Minneapolis and lending
1. "Associated Press News" February 6, 1930
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money also to co-operative associations for the purpose of actually
buying wheat at that price, whereas anybody could buy wheat in the ope:
market for, say, fifteen cents less.
,/icked speculators were doing it. They bought wheat in the
terminal markets at the market price, then shipped it back into the
country and sold it to co-operatives at the government price, clearing
thereby very handsome profits. The position of the federal Farm Board
at this time was painful and ridiculous. Professional grain traders
were getting its money. The last step had then to be taken. That
meant to invoke the powers of Section 9. On February 11, the Board an|
nounced the existence of the Grain Stabilization Corporation and that
it had been provided with vlO ,000,000. of government money "to carry oij
1
its initial operations". ITature of initial operations not specified. II
This Grain Stabilization Corporation appeared at once in the wheat pit
at Chicago, buying Llay futures with government money. There was no
ground for surprise. It was all legal. The law was clear, and even
though .Section 9 was not mandatory, still the sequel was inevitable.
'There is there an instance of a Board or a commission exercising less
than its whole power? Nevertheless, the bald sight of the Government
standing in the pit and dealing in wheat futures along with profession;
speculators was too strong, and the Federal Farm Board began to hear
itself criticized. On March 6, it issued what was clearly a challenge
to the grain trade particularly and to all detractors in general. It
was this:
The Grain Stabilization Corporation will continue buying whes
b
1. "Farmers Build Their r.arketing Machinery" Bulletin, Lo. 3,
December 1930

at the market and remove from the market whatever additional quantity
that may he necessary to relieve the pressure and prevent any consider
ahle decline in wheat prices. The Federal Farm Board is prepared to
advance to this Farmers' organization whatever funds are necessary for
that purpose. The Stabilization Corporation is being accused of specu-j
lating in the grain market. There is no foundation in fact for such a
statement. The Stabilization Corporation is prepared and expects to
take delivery of all grain purchased on future contracts and merchan-
dise it as the market conditions will permit.
Kote, first, there is no limit. Any quantity of wheat neces
sary to he removed from the market will "be removed. Any amount of monety-
needful to this enterprise will he forthcoming.
lThe Federal Farm Board refers to the Grain Stabilization Coi
poration as "This farmers' organization". That it is a farmers' organi
zation is true only in a technical sense; all otherwise it is a limp
friction. '.Tho is it says what the Stabilization Corporation willdo?
It is the Federal Farm Board. There was the Grain Stabilization Corpor
ation created? On the desk of the Federal Farm Board. 'There did the
decision lie to buy Eay futures to whatever extent was necessary? In
the mind of the Grain Stabilization Corporation? No, in the mind of th
Federal Farm Board. The Grain Stabilization Corporation says nothing.
It has not even the voice to defend itself against the charge fhat what
it is doing is nothing else than speculation. It is the Federal Farm
Board that says to buy futures is not speculation if you expect to take
the actual grain in the hope of being abifce sometime to sell it at a
profit.
1. "The Farmboard Circular Fo. 3"
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At that interval the situation in wheat was as follows:
1, Enormous suns of Government money outstanding as loans on
wheat at prices away above its market value, and all such wheat likely
to pass into the hands of the Government by default of the borrov/ers.
2. Co-operative associations holding at a loss great quantities
of wheat bought with government money to support the price, much of
this wheat also likely to pass into the hands of the Government.
5. -he Federal Farm Board itself, through the Grain Stabiliza-
tion Corporation likely to find itself at the end of the old crop year
in possession of maybe 100,000,000 bushels of wheat, from its buying o
futures in the Chicago wheat pit.
4. And nowhere any control of new production, no way of touching
it save by exhortation.
To this vital weakness of its position the Federal Farm
Board was obliged to give its increasing anxiety. Five days after hav|n
announced that any amount of wheat necessary to event a further de-
cline in price would be removed from the market by the Grain Stabili-
zation Corporation, the chairman of the Federal Farm 3oard, in a tele-
gram to the governor of Forth Dakota said, "There is no possible solu-
tion of their problem unless we get the co-operation of the growers
themselves. Fo other industry in the world blindly produces without
any attention to the potential market possibilities. Your growers vail
ask how they are going to get along with a less production, but if theg
can get more money and we believe they can, by raising four bushels
where they now are raising five, why should they destroy the market by
rr
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raising the extra bushel? The present operations of the Stabilization
Corporation will undoubtedly result in their having upward of 100,000,
000 bushels of wheat on hand at the close of this present season, and
if farmers are going ahead trying to produce an additional surplus on
the basis that some way will be found tc take care of it on a fair
price level, they are going zo be mistaken."
The federal Farm Board had already borrowed Dr. John L.
Coulter from the Tariff Commission and sent him on a missionary errand
to the Forth ./est where he is well-known as an agricultural economist.
The errand was in the name of the Government to beg farmers to curtail
their wheat acreage.
So the Federal Farm Board with already one hundred bushels
of surplus wheat in a government basket, exhorting farmers to produce
less I
And the member of the radical farm bloc in Congress at the
same time saying that the only way you could get farmers to produce
less would be to shoot all the excess farmers.
'.Veil, there is the story of the first season of wheat, wheat
alone, under the agricultural market act, as far as it goes, it will
finish itself, '^he sequel will be what it will be.
How to be set forth is the theory under which the federal
Farm jDoard acted to the extreme of its powers. Continuously in its
mind was the thought that a ilational crisis existed, -here was first
what happened in all Street in October, in consequence of what rresi-
dent Foover had called a vast contagion; then the reaction to that
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event of reckoning upon economic conditions in general.
To avoid a serious depression in the country, finance and
industry, under the active guidance of the Government
,
pooled their
resources of Will, capital and imagination in a manner and to a degree
never before attempted, For the first tine a »7all Street disaster of
the first magnitude was not followed by senseless disorder in the eco-
nomic structure as a whole.
But, whereas the wel fare of industry, the continuity of its
works, wages, and profits, were the first concern of finance, there was
no such thing as an organization of private finance and powerful trade
associations to come to the aid of agriculture cr to save it from the
evils of necessitous and wasteful liquidation, vo do for agriculture
vrtiat was doing for industry became, thereforo, the ^ob of the Federal
Farm Board. It had the power, the means to organization, and the mono™
•
Specifically, and only in view of the national emergency then
existing, the federal Farm Board undertook to prevent a panic in agri-
cultural commodity prices, Such was the theory on which it acted under
Section 9, to the limit of its powers. And all this was apart from wha
else it was doing, and intending to do, gradually to improve the econom
ic status of agriculture by sound means.
Its decision to set up the Grain Stabilization Corporation
and enter the wheat pit as an unlimited buyer of future contracts was
formed at what it considered to be a critical moment. ..-heat prices
were very weak, around y1.00 per bushel, ~rade experts sat with the
Federal Farm ooard saying the price would go to 80 or 75 cents, trimly
1. "Farmers Build -heir Marketing i-achinery" — Bulletin ..o. 3«
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it might have "been wise to let the price go. heat at seventy-five
cents would have solved at least three of the federal Farm Board's pro-f
hi ems automatically;
First
;
It would have "brought many more fanners intc the co-operative
associations in order to oh tain Federal aid.
Second; At seventy-five cents the -jnerican surplus might have "been
sold in the world market and got out of the way.
Third; 'x'here would he nothing like the spectacle of seventy-five cent
wheat to make farmers curtail wheat acreage.
Keanwhile with the Government willing to lend :;1.25 a "bushel to farmers,
so that each might individually hold hack his share of the surplus, th€
farmers need not have "been hurt "by a temporary drop in the market price
to seventy-five cents, provided that all joined co-operatives.
Yet in the opinion of the Federal Farm board, a decline in
the price of v/heat to seventy-five cents would have "been a first class
economic disaster; moreover, it would have "been grievous for farmers
outside the co-operatives, and therefore, "beyond the aid of the Govern-j
ment. The Board went further in wheat than in any other commodity,
and for that reason the narrative of wheat receives more attention thaij
it would perhaps intrinsically require. It illustrates luminously the
working of the whole law and perfectly represents, hesides, the ideals
that move the Board.
In cotton, it stopped short of setting up a stabilization coifl-
poration actually to "buy and remove the surplus from the market. But,
as in wheat, so also in cotton it undertook to lend an unlimited amount
of government money through the co-operatives up to a "base of sixteen
cents which v/as at that time its full market value. As with the price

of wheat, so with the price of cotton it went much lower, and the
Government found itself lending up to sixteen cents on cotton when any-|
one could "buy it in the open market for fifteen cents, ^s in wheat, sc
in cotton, the 3oard loaned the co-operative associations government
money to "buy the commodity for the purpose of withholding it from the
market. And the idea in both cases was the same, as shown in the fol-
lowing statement from the Chairman of the Federal Farm Board on Febru-
ary 25,: "Sorr.e objection has developed in the grain trade against the
action of the Farm Board in financing farm co-operatives in the purchas
of wheat and cotton in the present situation. The activities will con-
tinue in the interests of agriculture and business, as an emergency
measure in the present situation. I have no fear that co-operatives
will not be able to eventually market these purchases satisfactorily.
The Board is endeavoring through financing the farmers' own organiza-
tions, to help to restore stability and expedite recovery from a crisis
which the farmer did not create and for which he is not responsible.
"Critics of the Agricultural Marketing Act have objected that
the remedy is to be applied to the distributive system, whereas the ill
of agriculture are due to defects in the productive organization of the
industry. However, any really intelligent and searching diagnosis of
unsatisfactory prices is likely to emphasize the existence of acute or
chronic surpluses and thus lead to critical and constructive proposals
for the conduct of agriculture's producing department. Indeed, the act
itself explicitly states that one of the Board's four lines of proced-
ure shall be to aid "in preventing and controlling surpluses in any
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agricultural commodity, through orderly production and distribution, s
as to maintain advantageous domestic markets and prevent such surpluse
from causing undue and excessive fluctuations or depressions in prices
for the commodity.""''
The problem being one of better economic organization in agr
culture, ameliorative measures are to start at a point where existing
organization is greatest, or, if you please, disorganization least projf
mounced. It appeared that the distinctive form of modern business or-
ganization appropriate to agriculture is the co-operative association
and co-operation has been predominantly concerned with marketing activjj-
ities.
But even accepting this as good strategy for the attack, two
questions are still to be faced; how heavy are the odds, and how brigh
are the prospects of victory? .Vhoever attempts to answer these questions
must either be blessed with omniscience or buoyed up by the valor of
ignorance, -''or ourselves, we ^hall be content merely to set forth
what we consider the essential issues raised by the creation of a Fed-
eral Farm Board within the structure of our government.
Agriculture is to be aided in saving itself throug?i the
agency of large-scale joint action similar to that found in other indus-
tries. To propose this is openly to throw down the gauntlet to the
farmer, challenging him on the ground of his most deepl;/ rooted prepos.
session. Sv^gfiy^here and always he has cherished the idea of himself
as "the independent farmer". But the Federal Farm Board has not been
anointed this god; it smites hip and thigh the idol of farmer "indepen-l
= « 1 1 -
dence." The hand of iconoclasm is tearing at the foundations of one
of our most ancient tribal gods. Before he topples, or "before the
iconoclasts retire in discomfiture, let us take a closer look at his
lineaments and the virtues which tradition ascribes to him.
A grave problem confronts the federal Farm Board. You can-
not have co-operation without co-operators, and the rank and file of
American farmers still live by the creed of individualism in which thejfr
were reared. 'The Farm Board may be called upon to aid sor^e of the es-
tablished and successful co-operatives. But after all, these have
shown a considerable ability to take care of themselves, and facilitating
their future efforts would be but a small and not very brilliant star
in the Farm Board's crown on the last great day. The real purpose for
which the Board was brought into being is to do something significant
about the low net prices of our great staple products — prices that
have been disastrous for millions cf farmers scattered from one end of
the country to the other, and that have produced a decade of agricul-
tural depression.
Grain, livestock, cotton and tobacco are four sprawling
giants whose unco-ordinated movements and perverse conduct have caused
national humiliation, if not alarm. They are badly in need of some
tutorial or disciplinary agency that can set them squarely on their
feet, tidy their appearance, steady their movements, give them the snajji
and smartness that distinguish the other members of our industrial
family.^"
It would take a sizable volume to analyze the present state
or organization and. tne past nistory oi' organizational effort in any
1. "Farm Reli&f™ James E. Boyle
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one of these "branches of our agricultural industry. ~iven in this brieff"
article, however, we may perhaps "bo able to present a thumbnail sketch
which will illustrate by a single instance the case of farmer "indepen -
dence" versus the Farm Board. For this purpose we shall take the grai: l-
growing industry, to whose grooming the Farm Board has already laid itft
hand.
The first farmers* grain elevator of which we have record
had its origin in the late fifties. "hrough the ups and downs of
Grange and Farm Alliance history, the movement retained a tenacious foot-
hold, but it showed little expansion until near the end of the century
Then it found itself, and for a few years fought a brilliant battle in
which it vanquished the hosts of line elevator monopoly and broke through
local shipping points to put its grain directly in the great terminal
market centers. Overlapping this movement was another which aimed to
establish co-operative terminal selling agencies, and which has, over
the years, produced a handful of such concerns capable of maintaining
their own existence but exerting negligible effect on the grain market
Just after the .'orld Var the craze for "commodity pools" swept rapidly
from the Pacific Northwest over into the I.-ississippi Valley until it
included more than a dozen of the principal wheat-producing states.
After barely a decade, less than half of these wheat pools were still
in existence. The survivors seemed unwilling to die, "but were unable
to move forward to accomplish any of the significant results which v/er
expected of them. Each one of those groups has been directed by men
who. were close to the soil — "farmer -minded" — and thus thoroughly
rc
indoctrinated with the traditional code of farmer "independence." No
one of the three would work with any of the others, Their idea of co-
operation was that others work with than. They preferred rusty obso-
lescence to the pain and humiliation of "being melted down and recase i 1
a new form "better designed to fit the farmers' needs.
No douht each of these three factions hoped and sought to "be
the recipient of the Farm Board's funds and favor, which would enable
it to expand into a mighty agency of salvation for the grain farmer.
But the hard-boiled Board took little account of their separate sover-
eignties, their stubborn sense of independence. Behind closed doors
it gave them a brisk injunction to forget the past and get together in
a single co-ordinated enterprise, a system of producer grain marketing
which would include "both country shipping and terminal selling, and
which would pool the interests of all their producer members in the
common cause of more economical handling and the most skillful distri-
bution possible.
Apparently the leaders who received this well reasoned mes-
sage from an outside agency occupying a position so well calculated to
command respectful attention have set seriously about the business of
designing a co-ordinated grain-marketing systeir. which would provide an
integrated agency of contact between grain producers and the Federal
Farm Board, But however skillful their draftsmanship, however well
designed the marketing machinery which they propose to set in action
yet another question remains to be answered: Will the farmers sun-port

But if it is to accomplish its appointed purpose the farmer
must turn over his grain to it and must supply a reasonable part of th^
capital with which it is to do business. She Farm Board stipulated
two conditions to the conference of fifty representatives of present
co-operative grain-marketing agencies:
First; The several factions must throw in their lot with a single
co-ordinated system of grain marketing, so that there may be
one representative or authoritative agency with which to dea!
Second: This organization must be on a sound commercial basis adequate
to its needs; must have an initial capital of at least ten
rrillion dollars.
i-ven this would be sufficient only for an organization that could serve
as a nucleus for the comprehensive producer-owned marketing system whicfi
is contemplated as the ultimate objective «^
Here, then, is a blunt challenge to the "independent" grain
farmers. ill enough of them and of their small and local business unilts
curtail their cherished sovereignty and delegate to a central governing
organization enough power to make it a significant competitive factor
in business organized upon the large scale which prevails in the busi-
ness world in which they aspire to play a brilliant part? To anyone
who knows the stingy contribution of capital and the fickle patronage
which even the surviving farmer grain-marketing agencies have been
vouchsafed by their nominal members, it must be a matter of grave doubt
whether the farmers who have clamored for relief to the grain-growing
industry are redely to pay the "quid pro quo" in terms of loyal and in-
telligent support.
'./ithout such support as this among existing grain co-operativfes
1. Federal Farm 3oard, Circular ITo. I

no r'arm Board that could be recruited anywhere could build a grain-
marketing agency which would get efficient merchandising of even that
part of the total grain supply which this most nearly co-operative
fraction of the grain industry controls. As for doing anything througtj
such an agency toward the stabilization of any but the most local dis-
parities of price, that is utterly out of the question. Before much
could be done toward real price stabilization, even intra-seasonally
,
there would have to be allegiance and a working scheme of government
covering the dominant portion of the industry — the several million
farmers scattered over most of our states, the in-an-outers as well as
established producers, '-'he aim certainly will not be accomplished
within the present pattern of farmer "independence".
Only three alternatives seem to be embraced within the logic
of our agricultural situation. - irst T our farmers may remain "indepen-l
dent", disorganized, discouraged; accepting such economic adjustment as
the blind, relentless working of economic laws may eventually bring.
Mature in the long run strikes its own equilibrium. Second , there is
the "noble experiment" upon which the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1929 has embarked us. -his looks to voluntary co-operation of broad
scope under government auspices as a means toward the rationalization
of the several branches of our agricultural industry. 32he purpose is
to effect a quicker and more socially satisfactory equilibrium through
purposeful public and private action. It can be accomplished only if
the farmer puts off his ancient garment of ragged individualism and
accepts the modern mode of expertly designed group action, -he third
alternative is some for;:: of compulsory co-operation.
r<-
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Public opinion in these safe and sane United States has al-
ready arrayed itself so stoutly against i^cNary-IIaugenism that v;e may
safely dismiss the third alternative for the present ut least. V/e shall
not set our feet in the path of comprehensive group action under govern-
ment compulsion, even though some rather decent hordics in neighboring
countries and overseas are experimenting with this sort of economic
mechanism. Kor is it our present intention to fall hack on laissez-
faire. As at no previous time in our history, it has been explicitly
declared to be the public policy of this country to solve the agricul-
tural problem, or at least to ameliorate the condition of those who
depend on agriculture for their livelihood, by economic engineering of
an ambitious sort.
V.hether this engineering project succeeds will depend upon
the soundness of the design and the correctness of the principles upon
which that design was made, but not less upon the quality of the mater
-j
ials with which the structure is tc be built. Even if the engineers
did not have a trustworthy handbook from which the strength of these
materials could be ascertained, they may have made a happy guess in
accordance with which their calculations will eventually prove them-
selves sound and workable. Or it may be that they will be able to de-
vise some clever schemes for treating even unsatisfactory materials in
such a way as to give the necessary strength or workability . We must
all of us stand by in interested and sympathetic contemplation of theii
efforts.
Can they infuse into the discrete individualism of agricul-
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ture as we have known it such a sense of solidarity, such a willingness
to accept even s elf-imposed discipline, that we shall really have agri-
culture economically organized on a "basis comparable with that of other
industries and commensurate with modem economic needs? vie have set
out to solve the agrarian problem in terms of organized agriculture.
But unless the nine gentlemen who constitute the federal Farm Board
can effect this shift from farmer "independence" to a reasonable measure
of industrial solidarity and internal control, "organized agriculture"
will still be known only in the gorgeously Bickwickian sense in which
the term has been used thus far."'''
President Hoover, it is said, has won a great victory over
the Senate by the defeat of its debenture amendment to the farm-relief
bill. That statement overlooks the future and an important part of thti
past. The debenture will appear as an amendment to the tariff bill.
That has been the plan of the Senators supporting it, all along, and a
logical plan too since the debenture is a device for making the tariff
effective on farm products. The Senate's insistence on inserting it
in the conference bill for agricultural relief was mainly for the pur-
pose of forcing the House to take a vote on it.
After all, the fundamental issue is not the result of a quarl
rel between two branches of our government, but what sort of relief th|
farmers are to get.
Three major agencies, or typos of agency, are contemplated ii
the successful measure. At the top is a Federal Farm Board, to be com
posed of twelve members, one from each Federal Reserve District. Under
1. "New Republic" April 30, 1930
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this may be found advisory committees for separate commodities, and
third, there may be created stabilization corporations for the several
commoditios, co-operatively owned, and empowered to deal in those com-
modities for the benefit of the co-operative owners.
The Federal Farm Board is to carry on research, educate the
farmers in the advantages and uses of co-operation, encourage the organ-
ization of co-operative societies, foresee and try to prevent overpro-
duction, and attempt to work out new uses for agricultural products.
The advisory committee will help in these activities. The chief func-r
tion of these committees appears to be, however, to suggest the forma-
tion of stabilization corporations whenever the need appears. The
theory is that such corporations should not be formed unless the cc-op-jf
eratives concerned want them. Their main purpose would be to buy sea-
sonal or temporary surpluses which threatened to break the market, and
hold them for better prices. They would operate under the strict supe
vision of the Farm Board.
To enable this sort of thing to be done, a revolving fund,
limited to .500,000,000 • is provided, of which Congress has appropriated
J150 ,000,000. Loans from the fund can be made to the stabilization
corporations, at low interest notes. They are to pay back when they
sell their accumulations of crops and are also to create reserves of
their own out of their possible profits, after they have paid a divi-
dend limited to eight per cent to their owners.
Other purposes for which the fund may be used are:
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First: To assist the orderly marketing of crops, and to reduce specu-
lation and distributive waste, by the creation of facilities
such as warehouses and terminals.
Second: To finance the insurance of co-oioeratives against reduction in
the prices of crops which they buy
These broad outlines of the plan permit a good deal of lati-
tude to administration. The most obvious comment is, that under able
and meticulously honest administration there is a chance of success,
but that the plan offers tremendous opportunity for political pressure,
profit or mere blundering. The tendency of any agency which offers to
private interests governmental "loans" is to pour out as much as possi-
ble, in the way of benefit to the interests concerned and allow the
loans to remain unpaid, except by the tax-payers. A straight-out sub-
sidy would often be preferable.
The plan, moreover, offers nothing in the way of emergency
relief to those agricultural staples which have been persistently over-
producing or whose prices are set by foreign markets. It would clearly
he absurd to form a state stabilization corporation and finance it to
hold off the market a crop like wheat, which suffers from low prices
/ear after year because of large world production. Or at least to hold
Dff enough to materially affect the price over an average period of
>rears. If that were attempted, the loans would not be repaid, the "re-
volving fund" would not revolve, and a continuance of overproduction
vould be encouraged until the corporation could stabilize us no longer
md the price collapsed. Much better, if that is the purpose, a sub-
sidy like the debenture, or an export agency like that proposed in the
IclTary-Haupien Bill, with the loss met out of equilization fees.
>•
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The only price aid to be s oundly offered under the plan woul<
he that which might he extended for one season only, or at most two, t(
a crop whose yield happened to he temporarily and unusually large on
account of weather or other accidental conditions. There would have to
he a moral certainty that the temporary surplus would in an average
period of years, he succeeded by an equivalent shortage.
If Mr. Hoover's desires are followed, this feature of the fell
will probably be used only in rare emergencies. He undoubtedly lays
more stress on its provisions for eliminating waste in the distribution
of food products. That such waste exists there can be little doubt.
That it is of a nature which can be remedied by any federal ?arm Agency
acting alone may, however, be douhted. To eliminate it will require a
long process of adjustment of railroad, terminal, trucking, and other
practices, not merely the substitution of new agencies for the much-
abused middleman. If the new agencies used the same methods and facil-
ities that middlemen do, the cost of distribution would scarcely be af-
fected merely by the elimination of the private distributor's profit.
3ut to make the necessary adjustments will require much time. It does
not fall under the head of "farm relief" so much as building for the
long future. .hen it is all done, the consumer rather than the farmer
lri.ll derive the benefit, as long as the farmers tend to produce more of
Bvery crop than the consumers want to buy.
Limitation of production is the essential basis of any endur-
ing relief to the farmer, whether the immediate instrument of relief be
stabilization corporation, debenture, crop insurance, clearing channels
L
of

distribution, cr semething else. It is difficult to see how this can
"be achieved except through the formation of sufficiently strong co-op-
erative farmers' societies, resting upon deeply ingrained co-operative
habits, loyalty, and understanding. .American experience abundantly
proves that farr.ers will not remain loyal enough to a co-cperative as-
sociation even to market through in bad times so long as they regard
it as a distant business agency in which they have no part other than t
profit by higher prices. That co-operativos of this sort could induce
farmers to limit production is difficult to believe. 'The super-agen-
cies contemplated by the bill might fit well on top of a co-operative
structure which had grown solidly up from the ground; but if we had
such a co-operative structure it could probably command its own researcjji,
planning and credit. Few successful co-operatives see much benefit in
the present bill. The most dubious feature of the Hoover plan is whether
it will succeed in building effective co-operation frcm the top down.
If it does not, there will be a real danger of financing artificial and
paper organization, and providing places for self-seekers, thus tending
to corrupt the whole movement and making the pathway more difficult for
the genuine co-operatives.
.e have before us the example of the Federal Land Banks, whic'
.
r:ere supposed to be co-operative, but which have been run by political
appointees ever since their foundations, and have been sadly abused by
patronage and other unsotmd practices of administration.
One feels it is almost certain that the farmers will Hk© dis-
appointed if they expect any immediate aid from it. It will take skil
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and foresight to make it work well enough In the long run so that the
farmers v/ill not lie sorry that it was passed.
The Federal Farm Loan system is a colossal centralized credit
community of ours, it is now ahcut fourteen years old, it "boasts nine-
teen millions of assets, and the achievement of having lowered farm moiflt-
gage interest rates hy ahout two per cent.
Economists point out that, even at rates lowered two per cent
farmers are paying too much for necessary financing. Our rates are
higher than those available in twenty other leading countries. Our far
industry earns only about four per cent on its investment. It cannot
afford to pay five to six per cent for mortgage loans, nor for market-
ing loans, to say nothing of the customary ten per cent for financing
crop production where such credit is obtainable. .hy, the farm organi-
zations demand, is the world's largest rural credit system offering tax:,
exempt bonds denominated as government instrumentalities, asking farmer:
of the United States to pay more for funds than the farmers in other
Lands £e» pay for loans from smaller systems."'"
That administration of our rural credit has not resulted in 1*7
anough interest rates is merely a first point made by critics, -hey con
plain that major social powers, carefully prepared for in drawing the
"arm Loan Act have been abused or prevented. One of these powers looks
;o the prevention of unnecessary deflation of the farmers' permanent
Investment, his land. That section of out 1 three-part system for farm
.oan relief, the Federal Land Banks, controls about ten per cent of the
;otal farm mortgage business of the country. Fne twelve regional Feder-
1. "Few Republic" February 1929
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al Land Panics are under government control. ITat ion-wide in their ac-
tivities tjiey possess regulatory pavers v/hich extend to the authority
to sustain farm land values to an important degree.
The acid test of whether this credit -community has a mind
involves this point, encouraged hy high prices and the "boom-methods
of farm realtors, some but hy no means all, of our farmers bought too
much acreage at inflated post-war prices, »7ith the failure of farm
income, deflation occurred, followed by a land crisis. Bankruptcies
and foreclosures were widespread and inevitable and the tragic proces-
sion of defeated farm families began to move to the city, seeking live-
lihood in other occupations than those to which they had been trained.
By 1924 it was a migration, then a route. Joday we know that we suf-
fered a net loss in farm population of four millions, and still land
panic is with us. Farms are still being foreclosed in numbers by mort-
gagees and land prices are strikingly subnormal. Jhe question is, did
the Farm Loan System display the disposition and the intelligence to
use its wide powers to sustain land values as much as possible?
Concrete acts allow ground for belief that the system exerted
its powers, perhaps blindly, to the positive detriment of agriculture,
for -whose relief it was designed. -or, somewhat casually, when defla-
tion of farm prices was well under way, the federal Farm Loan Board ini-
tiated a drastic policy, the significance of v/hich — since nominally
it had to do an accounting — remained obscure for several years, -res -
idents of the rederal Farm Land Banks were advised that "acquired real
estate" — foreclosed farms — must be completely charged off the books

immediately after talcing. Since Land 3anks have no assets save lands,
this ruling was conducive to inflicting a rate of one hundred per cent
depreciation upon the business, -hereafter, for more than five years,
all farms foreclosed were not listed in any value whatever as assets.
The true asset value of these farms v;as thus concealed, -he effect of
this ruling was calamitous."*"
Like all other agencies lending on land, the .ederal Banks
had to carry an overburden of real estate, although they were not, in
most instances, so badly off as state or certain national banks, or
many insurance and mortgage concerns.
Axl identical problem faced all alike: How to carry the land
until it could be profitably sold. "HOLD" was the v;atch-word» Experts
advised a private insurance company on heavy mortgage investments that
to sell 5,000 acres in parcels scattered throughout lowa at forced sale
would depress farm land prices throughout the State twenty-five dollars
per acre.
Commercial banks, having demand obligations, were soon com-
pelled to sell, Land banks, however, were in a favored position. Ae-
cepting no deposits, free fro: demand obligations, they were also forti -
fied by a provision in the /arm Loan -ct designed to meet just such a
crisis, and to allow for the cycle of industrial ups and downs, the
Land Banks are empowered to hold land five years if necessary and no
fixed rate of depreciation is set. o-enerally speaking, the federal
Land ^anks were in a good position to hold, since appraisals for the
most part have been conservative. Testimony given in Congressional
1. "New republic" February 1929

hec-rings states that in Iowa, for example, .100. per acre was arbitrar
ily fixed as the top value that would ever "be accepted as a lending
basis, ihe federal Land Bank loaned closer to thirty-five per cent
than the legal fifty per cent of the accepted valuaticn.
'±'he policy of complete, immediate depreciation of all assets
however, changed the complexion of the situation, since it deeply af-
fected the "balance sheets of many of the federal Land Banks. 3?e make
a reasonably good showing, the Land Banks of various districts had to
sell, ihere were few "buyers at any price. As tight-pressed commercial
oaiilcs attempted to liquify assets nearly all at once, an abundancy of
land accumulated, ..Tien, regardless of market conditions, certain land
Banks joined the stampede and dumped land — sometimes wholesale — on
a market which was already bad, priced dropped likewise.
"The St. Paul federal Land Lank sent to the auction block, ir
a single batch, parcels of land worth one million, the cash price re-
ceived was i375,000. i'he transaction brought a large direct loss to
the banks, but its indirect losses were worse. Ly depression values
the security behind every good loan was reduced, not only for this bank
but for all mortgage agencies. And in human loss 2 warmers in no visi-
ble way related to the federal Land .bank saw their equities in their
farms diminish, and in some cases vanish, ouch a process inevitably
increased the emigration which it was the obvious duty of the System tc
exert itself to check." 1
"In the freat Spokane Land Bank a serious situation was reachjfed
by 1924. federal Land Banks have interlocking liability, all are respc ti-
1. "Hew Republic" — June 1929
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sible for the losses in any. Spokane's overburden of foreclosed lands
(unpaid taxes) alarmed the Federal Board and the other eleven banks.
The condition set up by law for receivership of any bank is default of
interest on its bonds. This was not reached at Spokane, nevertheless,
a feceivership, camouflaged under, the name of the Spokane Commission,
was set up. Today Spokane stockholders complain that their bank never
actually required any such treatment; that, had they been allowed to
count their real assets at book values (farms appraised at ten millions
which the bank had foreclosed) they would have worked out their problerr
They complain that a large land-sales department, employing forty peopl^
and extra officials, exerts a costly and dual control over the bank's
affairs which Spokane is required to stand because the other eleven
banks furnished up to 1928 some 2,800,000 to help Spokane out."
1
v/e lack sufficient "information to test the justice of these
contentions. A cloudy atmosphere has been maintained for some years
over the actual contract between the Spokane bank and the other eleven
banks, about the amount of land sold, whether wholesale or retail, as
well as about the prices received and the names of the purchasers. The
apparent secrecy has its' excuse in the probable effect on the bond mar-
ket. If the farmers of other districts had known that three millions o
funds otherwise available for dividends to themselves v/ere diverted to
the Northwest necessarily or unnecessarily, stockholders as well as bon<j.
holders might have exerted themselves in an effort to find out whether
the situation was caused and prolonged by stupidity or by design.
For the financial aid given Spokane taxed the resources of
1. "New Republic" — June 1929
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other banks, and the continuance of the charge-off policy even more so
Today the Columbia, S. C. Bank is said to face a more serious situatioi
than any other. Six out of twelve of the Federals, "by 1927, showed
their embarrassment by cutting their dividends, four reduced, two paid
more however, .by these facts were omitted from the 1927 Annual reporl
of the Farm Loan Board to Congress is a question of interest. Fcr two
years those annual reports of the Farm Loan Board have been oddly de-
layed. The 1926 report was withheld until Congress had adjourned.
Finally submitted Lay 1927 it was not printed for general distribution
until the very last of that year. The 1927 report, due in the first
quarter of 1928, was held up until the Senate finally passed a special
resolution demanding it.
The farmers have long complained that the tariff is a one-
sided affair, which protects manufacturing more than it protects agri-
culture. The economists of the agrarian movement which has been active
in recent years have never tired of pointing out, the inequality of
farmers and manufacturers under the tariff was not the result of simply
an inequality in the duties levied on farm and factory products respec-
tively. It really arose because the most important farm duties were
ineffective in giving the protection to domestic prices which they were
ostensibly designed to furnish. As long as we are mainly a wheat-ex-
porting rather than a wheat-importing nation, we cannot raise the price
of most of the wheat grown in this country merely by putting a protec-
tive duty on imports, whether that duty be one of five or five hundred
per cent. If the wheat farmers had monopolistic power and could re-

strict production "behind a tariff barrier, they could he protected, if
they could control prices sufficiently so that they could sell in this
country at a higher price than they can sell abroad, they could be pro -
tected. But wheat farmers have none of these powers. That is what
makes the tariff on wheat less effective than the tariff on steel rail;*
Likewise the tariff on other grains, on cotton, and indeed on most of
the important agricultural products, is nearly useless, either because
these things could not be imported to any extent in any case or becaus i
their production cannot be successfully restricted.
No more severely logical action has been taken by the Senate
for years than the amendment which is the export debenture in the tar-
iff bill. If it kills the tariff bill, that will be only because the
tariff bill ought to be killed. The debenture belongs in the tariff
bill.
The HcITary-Eaugen plan in its various forms, was devised to
remedy this defect in the -American protective system, riut the llcllary
Haugen plan was rejected, and now the debenture, simpler and more
easily workable, has taken its place. Its whole purpose is to enable
wheat and other farmers to do what the steel companies can do as a
result of protection, namely, sell their products in this country at
a higher price than those products can be sold abroad, in the face of
foreign competition. If anything short of a high degree of concentra-
tion of ownership in agriculture, such as prevails in steel, can accom-
plish this result, the debenture can accomplish it. If a protective
system which raises the price of manufactured products is good for the
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country, a protective system which raises the prices of agricultural
products is good for the country. If it is unsound economically to
grant a subsidy to farmers, by means of the debenture, to be paid out (jjf
consumer T s pockets and out of governmental revenues, it is equally un-
sound to grant a subsidy to manufacturer's tc be paid out of consumer^
pockets, and by means of a restriction of governmental revenues. Pro-
tection does restrict governmental revenues, because it rakes the re-
ceipts fror import duties less than if these duties were low enough to
admit more imports. If the debenture cannot achieve its avowed pur-
pose of making protection effective for the majority of farmers, then
that purpose cannot be achieved, and protection for manufacturers is
one-sided and unjust.
"To any student of the tariff, it is obvious that so far as
solving the farm problem is concerned, the new tariff bill is a very
minor factor. /ithout doubt, agriculture as a whole would have been
much better off had the tariff not been changed at all, because the in-J
crease in rates on manufactured and other non-agricultural products pre
v: ded in the present bill will burden farmers as a whole more than the
increases on agricultural products will benefit farmers as a vhole.
Agricultural groups should, therefore, exert their influence in secur-
ing legislation to aid in establishing and developing better marketing
machinery, better tax policies and better credit facilities, which will
in the long run, produce a greater benefit and help a larger proportior
of our farmers than will any possible tariff legislation.^-
1. flffew Republic" - June IS 29

THL OUTLOOK JCH TKI1 ffAECIIK
The Board frankly admitted that its stabilization operations
in the wheat market have "been a costly and experimental venture with
the outcome very much in doubt. vhile insisting that the operations
have contributed materially to support farm prices of wheat, the Board!
made it clear that the results had not been all that had been hoped fo^
.
It averred further that stabilization, at best, is only temporary and
that in the last analysis the hope of the wheat grower rests upon his
own willingness to curtail production. There is a field of stabiliza-f
tion measures — just how large a field the Board is not in
.a. position
to determine — but experience described indicates to sore extent the
difficulty and hazards that are involved. _he reduction cf acreage is
the obvious and economic remedy for the overproduction if wheat. The
i'arm Board's record is one of sincere and persistent striving and of a
degree of success already attained, a.nd it presents the prospect that
achievement of the ultimate goal of the government's policy will be
accomplished, and thus agriculture will be made as stable and secure as
other American industries are. The Farm Board's statement of its plans
with respect to the 1931 wheat crop combines strai ght thinking and
plain speaking.
Today the two most powerful arguments are ranged squarely on
the side of non-stabilization. They are first, the facu that a policy
of wheat buying by the Government would physically swamp the alroady
overflowing storage facilities cf the country, and second, that the

71
Board hasn r t the funds to see it through another season of -price sta-
bilization.
The Federal Government is helpless other than to make financ-
ing easier and to assist in the establishment of sound co-operative or-
ganizations. Such legislative enactment as the equalization fee and the
export debenture, for dealing with present day exportable surpluses,
are little more than quack remedies. They would result only in taking
farmers to the mountain tops showing them the world, and casting them
1
down again. Such proposals contemplate subsidizing the exportaticns
of excess sujjplies. Most importing countries have embargoes of counter
vailing duties that would defeat the very purpose of the proposals,
'oreover, dumping of surpluses on foreign markets, if permitted, would
depress world prices to perhaps the extent of the subsidy, thereby ben-
efitting no one. American producers can help themselves most by restrict-
ing themselves to the domestic market, thus caning within the clearance
circle of protection that this government of itself can give, whatever,
the world situation may be.
Aith reduction in acreage offering the way out, .J?thur B. Hyd
the Secretary of Agriculture, and Alexander Legge, Chairman of the Aede^
al Farm Board made a "Paul Aevere Hide" through the Plain States last
summer, sounding the warning before audiences that over-production pre-
2
sents tne greatest dangers. Although many of their listeners were
hostile, their trip accomplished some of the results they desired. Sta-
tistics compiled by the Department of Agriculture show that the winter
wheat acreage this year will be smaller by 4-g- per cent than it was last
1. "New Republic" lay 21, 1930
2. "Time Magazine" June 2, 1930
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year.
The reduction is not large enough, but it is a beginning.
Time may come when wheat farming will be limited to those sections of
the country where the grain can be raised most cheaply and in the larg-
est quantities per acre. But any such transition will be slow. It is
an extremely difficult task to turn farmers from one of the easiest
crops to grow, but the change :.;ust come if disaster is to be averted.
For neither the yield nor the cost of production is uniform. A ruin-
ous price for some farmers permits a fair return to others, irofit is
made on some cheap land brought under cultivation by the tractor and
the combine, even if the grain grown on it brings only seventy-five
cents per bushel. In recent months the price paid at the farm had
broken below this ridiculously small figure. Continuation of such re-
turns cannot but drive tens of thousands of farmers intc bankruptcy.
High priced land cannot be made to pay at such figures. The income de-
rived is hardly encugh to meet the cost of seed, ploughing, planting
and harvesting, no account being taken of interest on the mortgage; the
balance left for profit is practically all.
However strong the arguments may be that wheat must be plante L
as a rotating crop to benefit the soil; market conditions make it plain
that much of the land now used for ..heat will have to be turned to othei"
purposes.
Objections tc the diversified farming tiras indirectly suggested
may explain in part the demand for such cure alls as the equalization
fee and the export debenture, "'"-he prime purpose of these proposals is
(
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to permit the farner to go on expanding his acreage and increasing his
production, selling as much of it as he can at a high price in the horn
r.arket and dumping the surplus ahroad. But "because of the world sur-
plus, the foreign markets cannot absorb our over-supply, even if they
were willing to do so. -1 favorite argument heretofore has "been that
however great the surplus might be, aty one organization "buying and
holding 25,000,000 bushels of wheat could peg any price it desired. Il
,
an effort to check the slump in prices last spring, the -ederal Farm
Board "bought 50,000,000 bushels of the 192 S crop. It did check the
decline temporarily, out prices have since fallen to a lower level thai
at any time in more than a decade."'" The very fact that the board was
holding that tremendous quantity of grain and would have to put it on
the market some time has had a depressing effect on the market. For
the government to buy whatever surplus the farmers raise is out of the
question, There seems to be no satisfactory alternative to the program]
the -dmini strati on is sponsoring for reduced acreage.
The agricultural difficulties have "been accentuated "by the
worst drought in history. The absence of rain in some of our great agri-
cultural regions throughout much of last summer and fall caused a loss
of approximately 700,000,000 bushels of corn, reduced the hay crop "by
12,000,000 tons, destroyed thousands of truck gardens and burned pas-
2
tures and ranges. Immediate action was taken. National, State, and
county committees were appointed, disastrous as the drought has been,
it may help to solve the problem presented by~"the wheat surplus. The
great bulk of the corn crop is used ordinarily to fatten hogs, cattle
1. '-.Ycrld's "./ork" February 1931
2. "Federal Farm Board questions and Answers" Circular Ho. 1
Larch 1930
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dairy stock, horses and poultry, Although wheat is worth uoro than
corn normally, corn has "been sell in.; recent 1. i'or more than wheats due
to the shortage in the one instance and the over supply in the other.
Under the circumstances , soj;;e farmers hasve suhstituted wheat for corn
as feed, cracking and crushing it and using it in combination with hay
Such use will reduce "the wheat surplus somewhat, off-setting in part th )
loss of foreign markets, -he farming feeding wheat worth seventy cents
a "bushel in the market gets better than one dollar for it at the presen
Torices paid for live stock.
Agriculturists emphasize that the loss of foreign markets is
real with respect not only to wheat but to cotton and other products,
xhe total volume of agricultural exports from this country for the fis-
cal year ended c; une 50th last was the smallest for apy year since 1910,
iue to lower prices and increased competition as well as the inability
jf Europeans to buy because of the world wide depression. An extremely
Important factor, too, is that governments of countries which have been
Large importers of our staple products are encouraging ho. e production t
tieet horr.e demand. The distress of farmers whether caused by boycotting
ibroad, by the drought or by overproduction, is so acute that reopening
)f the whole agricultural controversy in Congress is forecast. It may
iccoraplish something, but the chances are it will result in nothing but
leated words. President Hoover and his agricultural advisers hold that
;he Government cannot accept any of the plans advanced for the handling
>f exportable surpluses. The advocates of relief legislation it would
>e vetoed; and it could not be passed over the veto.
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In the last analysis the solution is economic not political.
That much discussed governmental agency, the Federal Farm Board though
it has made mistakes, has jqpplied itself whole-heartedly to the econom-
ics of the situation. The Board has "been condemned by outstanding pro-
ponents of the debenture proposal and it has been a disappointment to
many of the farmers themselves. Evidently it was expected to wave scumej
sort of magic wand that would rehabilitate agriculture, at the very
moment that the nation was experiencing a wave of industrial depression
The Administration believes, however, that the organization
has accomplished all that could have been expected of it, existing cir-
cumstances being taken into consideration. The changes in personnel
necessitated by the prospective retirement of Chairman Legge, C. C.
Trague, and Sam McKelvie do not foreshadow changes in policy, eatcept as
regards any effort to stabilize the prices of outstanding commodities.
The futility of the action seems to be indicated by the experience of
the Board last year. Its purchases of wheat and cotton, on the basis
of the market at this time, representa a loss to the Grovernment of ap-
proximately 60,000,000.
Turning to conditions which preceded this latest of development
tit may be said that the recession of business, necessarily limiting the
purchasing power of the people, has had an adverse affect on the activ-
ities of the Board but this does not explain the delay in putting agri-
3ulture on an equality with industry. The explanation is that the Boart
,
aeeds ever so much more time to bring about the readjustment than has
passed since its creation. There may be honest differences of opinion

whether the 3oard is on the right track, hut study in '.Vashington and
in the fields indicates it should have ample opportunity to demonstrat
the soundness of its program. Figures show surpluses in the too "basic
crops, "hy, then, should our farmers, a consi derahle proportion of
whom are college graduates and many of whori en«joy all modern conveniei
strive to compete in world markets with the peasants of other lands?
./hy, indeed, should they attempt to raise more foodstuffs than they car.
possibly sell advantageously, world conditions heing as they are, where
hy producing smaller quantities, the return for their efforts would he
as large if not larger than it is today.
If the answer is more than the farmers have the land and ought
to cultivate it then the observation is in order that the industrial
plants of this country he idle whenever the manufactured products escee L
the demand* '.That, for example, would have happened if as many automo-
biles had been manufactured in 1930 as in 1929?
Another observation, still more pertinent, is that some if not
all the land released from grain and cotton production can be turned ad-
srantageously to other purposes, The tariff act, the most beneficial to
agriculture in all the history of tariff making, offers opportunity to
produce crops that could not be grown and sold heretofore in competition
Tith the world.
Diver sification is important, but revolutionizing the practices
if the farmers is vital also. The Board believes its prime task is to
lelp the farmers organize so they can control not only their production
>ut their marketing.
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If the task should be completed satisfactorily, operators
and speculators Bould be quite generally eliminated, it is only natui -
al that they can see no good at all in the plan. Someone always suf-
fers when a new program is inaugurated, operators and speculators hap-
pen to be "IT" in this instance. In justice, of course, it should not
be done. The prime consideration is whether the change will be suffi-
ciently beneficial to the great body of people to justify the change
?he i>oard is concerned, not with the consumer but the farmer.
It believes it can help him immeasurably by revolutionizing organiza-
tion and distribution. So far as organization is concerned, it is en-
countering difficulties, The farmer is nothing if not an individualist
,
and the lesson of co-operation is difficult for him to learn,
Presi the administration point of view, co-operation offers
the only solution of the problem confronting the imerican farmers.
Therefore, it is pushing the movement. It has helped bring into being
the Farmers' National urain Corporation with a capital of 010,000,000.
the American Cotton Co-operation Associut ion with a capital of $50,000
©00. and the national Wool Marketing Corporation which has a million
dollar sales agency. Another million dollar organization is the Nation-
al Livestock Marketing Association, All told, advances of 280,000,000.
have been made by the 3oard since it began functioning. Of this sum,
about Al 80, 000,000, has been repaid.
The Farm
-oard would set up great light-house institutions fo:
the farmers, f armer -owned, farmer-controlled, and farmer-financed whic i
should serve agriculture as the Federal Aeserve System serves finance,
1. "Farmers Build Their Marketing Machinery" Bulletin No* 3,
December 1930
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as Standard Oil serves as pacemaker for the oil industry, and as the
United States Steel serves for steel, it would, as soon as those insti|J-
tutions are paid for by the farmers, turning them over to the farmers
themselves to be a& independent of the ^arm Board or the Government as
any other corporation in the land, Thus the Board expects to give the
farmer some control over his own products after they leave his line
fences and enter the markets of the world, Thus we expect to give the
farmer an organization which can bring to bear upon his problems the
collective thought of his industry, survey his probably markets, and on
a nationwide basis, limit production to the probable demand.
There may be many questions and problems of purely sectional
nature but many years of experience prove that agriculture is not one oi
them, farmers throughout the Southern ^ier of States contribute to the
rolume of the cotton crops and thus fix the price for all. -.aimers in
practically every state add their volume to the surplus of wheat, r'arm-
)rs in Aroostook County, ...aine pit their potato production against the
potatoes of Virginia and the Carolinas and against the potatoes of Idaho
tad Minnesota and Colorado. So interwoven are thoir interests, so inex-
ricably mixed their problems, that no answer vail be found for farm pro
ems of one that is not also an answer to the problem as to that commodi
1
'or all sections.
llor is the farm problem local from any angle. If there is dis-|
;ress among the cotton and grain farmers in Texas, that fact is speedily
•eflected in past due notes and unpaid accounts in the hands of the bank
>rs and merchants who serve the area. The fountains of credit are quick Ly
:-
. "New Republic" June 1S29
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dried up, the means of the merchant to buy more .^oods is frozen, and
the outlet of the merchant to sell more goods disappears, -he salesmar
fro r . St. Louis reports to the wholesaler that he made no collection of
accounts due and no sales of new goods, ihe wholesaler must renew his
notes at the "batik:, the factories located in Detroit or Philadelphia sodjp.
found that there is no market demand. The industry in turn must lay
off its men or find si marIce t elsewhere.
Thus the distress in Texas finds its reaction in the counting
houses of merchants, hankers and factories everywhere, do section of tjhi
United States lives to itself alone. He is a wise industrialist who
recognizes his interdependence and a foolish manager if he shuts his
eyes to distress anywhere.
The farmer is in distress* There is divergence of opinion as
to what should he done to aid him. Perhaps he can aid himself "better
than anyone can help him. If co-operative effort is a solution, he
should apply himself to the principle. If marketing of his own products
will he "beneficial he should attempt it.
The benefits here listed include the chief agricultural pro-
ducts on which the tariff is most effective. let one cannot fail to he
impressed with the smallness of these benefits, even though they com-
prise the main portion of all those derived from agricultural tariffs.
To any student of the tariff, it is obvious that, so far as
solving the farm problem is concerned, the new tariff bill is a very
minor factor. ithout doubt, agriculture as a whole would have been
better off had the tariff not been changed at all, because the increase
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in rates on manufactured and. other non-agricultural products provided
in the present bill will burden farmers as a whole more than the increases
on agricultural groups should, therefore, exert their influence in secur-
ing legislation to aid in establishing and developing better marketing
machinery, better tax policies, and better credit facilities, which wil
in the long run, produce a greater benefit and help a larger proportion
of our farmers than will any possible tariff legislation.
./nether the co-operatives will be able to sell out successfully
is a matter of opinion, jut whether the government's money is lost or
not is much less important than the principle involved when the Govern-
ment undertakes to establish, influence or support prices — to say at
a given time they are too low and that at a future time they will be
ligher. "he valuation of wheat at vl.25 for loan purposes was arbitrary
so was the valuation of cotton at sixteen cents for the same purpose,
3oth commodities were then too low, in the opinion of the Federal Farm
5oard; both went much lower, That is to say, the Government was wrong
loreover, it would be quite impossible to say how much of the decline ir
trices, both before and after the Federal Farm 3oard have fixed these
ealuea , was Owing to a national crisis and how much to normal facts.
The activities of the Federal Farm Board have touched, besides
rheat and cotton, such a variety of agricultural commodities as rye,
lorn, oats, barley, beans, flax, honey, buckwheat, rice, livestock, wool
nohair, tobacco, poultry, eggs, grapes, raisins, seeds, potatoes and
airy products. Generally two ideas were acting, and with no very clear
distinction between them. One was the idea to build up agriculture on g
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pyramidal co-operative basis, slowly, and the other was to prevent a
panic in agricultural commodities, on the ground that a national crisi
required it.
If, as the Federal Farm Board may complain, workings of the
first idea have been less noticed than those of the second, this is
because co-operation in agriculture for all purposes is a familiar prir
-
ciple, whereas the use of government money to influenee prices by direct
intention is a new and startling thing.
Take it in butter, The Federal Farm Board, in January, made a]
large loan to the "land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc." of Minneapolis, which
is one of the successful old co-operative associations in the country
Now, as to this loan one is bound to ask certain questions. If the Fedfl-
eral Farm Board is in the business of assisting distressed agriculture,
certainly it could have found many farmer organizations more in need of
aid than the "Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., " for as a solvent associa|-
tion, with a long record of profit and sound management, it could get
any reasonable accomodation of credit at the bank.
The answer is that, of course, it could borrow on reasonable
terms at the bank for all normal commercial purposes. But it could not
borrow money at the bank for the purpose of protecting the market price
of butter. That was the trouble. The price of butter was falling. It
iad fallen below thirty cents a pound and nobody knew where it might stdjp
.hat the Land O'Lakes Creameries needed was a large sum of money not on]y
for the purpose of holding its own butter off the market but also to bus
and store the butter of other associations, because they were all press-

ing it for sale on a falling market. The only source of money for that
purpose was the federal Farm Board. It loaned the money, the "Land
O'Lakes Creameries" bought up surplus butter and put it away, and with
what result? The price of butter advanced to thirty-six cents a pound
which was a fair price, and then everything was all right again.
One must ask, for v*iom was everything all right again? Is it
not very strange that the Government should lend money to butter makers
for the immediate purpose of advancing the price six cents a pound, whe i
there are 4,000,000 butter eaters unemployed? How is such use of gover 1-
ment money to be justified?
The answer is that if there had been a panic in agricultural
commodity prices the number of unemployed might have become 6,000,000.
And is butter an agricultural commodity? There again is a matter of
opinion. If the opinion is sound you may say the end justified the meais,
and pass it on; though not without wonder still that it lies in the wia-
dom of a Soard at V/ashington to say what price people shall pay for
DUtter in order that unemployment shall not increase; nor without wonded
at the seeming contradiction that, as it lends money to the "Land O'Lakes
Dreameries, Inc.," to buy and remove surplus butter from the national
(narket , the Federal rami Board at the same time issues a warning againsll
the overproduction of butter, exhorts farmers to eat more of it and sel]
Less, and then with the other hand, lends money to the Lower Columbia
Dairy Association for the purpose of increasing its plant.
Hear at this point the voice of the farmer saying, "Industry
sorrows money on its commodities at a private bank in order to postpone
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the sale of them and thus protect the price. .hy shouldn't agriculture
borrow money from the Government for the same purpose?"
The difference is almost too obvious to require statement. It
is true that private hanks lend money on surplus commodities to save th 3m
from being pressed for sale on a weak market, and that certainly is to
protect the price, but in swch private transactions the risk is shared
between lender and borrower, .hen agricultural producers borrow money
from the Government, they take no risk at all. Only the Government can
lose. If that is not a legal fact, it is a moral fact. The Government
could no more proceed against its agricultural debtors in the manner of
a private bank than it can eject settlers from federal irrigation pro-
jects for non-payment of their dues and water rents. Simply, it cannot
be done. 'Veil, then, you have the difference between borrov/ing with
risk and borrowing without risk, and this, human nature being what it i$
becomes the difference between sound and unsound.
The intent of the above is wholly expositive, that is, to show
that the Agricultural Marketing Act is, how it came to be what it is, whiflt
aas proceeded from it, and what was acting in the mind of the Federal
arm Board. Therefore, all discussion of the farm problem itself has
)een avoided.
There is a farm problem, both real aid unreal; both economic ai
)Olitical. The agricultural Marketing Act as a whole is the strongest
ipproach so far made to a rational solution of it. ITo fair conclusions
ire yet possible. It is too soon to pass judgment on an economic experil-
i lent of such magnitude. It may turn out to be a mistakan experiment in
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principle, in which case we shall be lucky to have made it while we
could afford it and to have put it behind us. On the other hand, it m^y
turn out that farmers will learn to support it intelligently and make
it work; in which case the initial errors and losses will be soon for-
gotten. The immediate misfortune is that all effects are in dispute,
even on their own merits. This is so far two reasons.
In the first place, the law has been administered with two
ideas in confusion, one permanent and one meant to be temporary. The
permanent idea was slowly to impose business principles upon agriculturb
and to improve its status through the co-operation of farmers, "he ide
meant to be temporary was that of preventing at any cost a panic in agri-
cultural commodities at a time of national crisis.
In the second place, the total rood of the Federal Farm Board*
operations under the emergency theory is by no means clear and perhaps
never will be. Very probably it is true that but for its enormous bid-
ing and lending operations in support of prices agricultural commoditie
would have gone much lower. Yet even this will be disputed, and much
more will it be disputed, whatever happens, that the work of the Feder-
al Farm Board under Section 9 was helpful toward future prices. There
is still a surplus to be disposed of. A slaughtered surplus is a loss
but an impounded surplus is a liability. If prices improve and the sur
plus now accumulating in the bands of the Government is worked off suc-
cessfully, some will say the Federal Farm Board made matters worse and
others that, but for its operations, everything would be very much wors|.
And nothing can be proved. Farmers themselves are at this

juncture divided. Agitation for further, even more direct relief is
very active, talcing the form of a demand that the Government shall pa-/
a direct "bounty on agricultural sports, thereby subsidizing the sur-
plus, -hat is the debenture plan.
Ileaavhile the one most significant fact is in the character oT
a precedent. Government money on a very large scale has "been actively
employed in agricultural commodity markets to uphold prices for the
farmer. That is what the radical farm "bloc wanted; that is what Sec-
tion 9 was for. But that was not the Hoover idea of farm relief.
This use of government money, if it continues is bound to in-
crease by extension for such is the natural law of political benefit.
If it increases with no positive control of production there is disas-
ter in sight for the United States Treasure. On the other hand, posi-
tive control of production by the Government entails such interference
in his affairs as no farmer would tolerate. That enigma lies in any
scheme of subsidy, bonus, guaranty or price production whereby a sur-
plus producing industry will be made more profitable than it already
is. The more profitable you make it the greater the temptation will b|
to produce a surplus. That is what the Federal Farm Board is facing
without power.
COITCLUSIOIT
Following is a brief summary of the outlook for the farmer.
Now is the time for real co-operation between the farmer and
the businessman and between the Federal Farm Board and the Grain trade.
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One represents the farmer and the other the buyer, Ilecent development
have led the farmer to think that "business is unfriendly to his interests.
This is not so. businessmen are friendly to agriculture, a merger of
interests is suggested. The Farm Board needs the facilities of the
grain trade and the grain trade needs the farmers* grain. Such co-op-
eration would eliminate the duplication of grain handling machinery
terminals, country elevators and selling organizations. 7e would all
gain thereby.
Farming costs in the United States in order to meet world com-
petition must he reduced to the same extent that costs have been reduced
in all other industries. Farms must be large enough to comprise eco-
nomical units. Lodern machinery must be used, tractors and other equi] -
ment must operate day and night. Skilled far:; operators of machinery
will receive as much pay as skilled workmen in the cities. J.1 foreigr
countries are encouraging the product icn of grain within their own
boundaries. Tariff walls are&aing erected everywhere. V/e are face to
face with the problem of world competition and we must expect lower
prices than we have had during the last five years in the world markets).
Give the farmer the same protection through our tariff as
other industries enjoy and the advantages, which labor has through re-
stricted immigration. One feels that it would be a serious mistake to
reduce our tariff on manufactured goods or to lessen the restrictions
on immigration, but it is only fair that our flexible tariff be adjusted
to give him similar advantages on his products.
Through outlook work of the united States Department of --gri-
1-
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culture, co-operating with the -octension service in the states, and or-
ganized effort among farmers, the message is being carried to the farm-
ers, backed with reliable statistical information so that acreage re-
adjustment and improved plans .of farm management will accomplish for
agriculture the adjustment of production to normal demand that has bee
brought about in most other branches of industry.
The major task of the federal -'arm Board is to assist farmers
in acting collectively, it is hopeless to expect that six and a half
million producing units can individually maintain a profitable level of
operation in a society where organization is the rule. Co-operative
marketing is the central feature of the Agricultural Marketing Act.
-his is a long-time program that contemplates the establishment of agri
culture on a sound economic basis and should not be confused with emer-
gency measures such as stabilization activities in wheat and cotton.
The latter is not regarded by the Board as the solution of the farmers'
economic problem.
.hile it is not to be expected that prices for farm commoditie
will return to wartime or other inflated levels, it is reasonable to
assume that the bottom has been reached and a basis somewhat higher thaii
the present will prevail, -he foundation of better return for the farm
er will be established, first, through more efficient and economical
production somewhat in keeping with what has been achieved in the fac-
tories, and second, through lower cost of distribution. The latter
means that the farmer must have a more important place in the marketing
of his products thereby eliminating waste and unnecessary costs, and

exercising a greater control over the w ages or income of those who are
nov; handling farm products, xhis means, of course, that some of the
thousands now engaged in distributing farm commodities must charge less
for their services or get into some other line of "business, it is un-
thinkable that the farmer should "be called upon to adjust himself to
a lower price level without others doing the same.
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